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BOOK REVIEWS
ON TRUST, LAW, AND EXPECTING THE WORST
INTIMATE LIES AND THE LAW. By Jill Elaine Hasday. New York, N.Y.:
Oxford University Press. 2019. Pp. 294. $34.95.

Reviewed by Elizabeth F. Emens∗

A

man says he will marry a woman, while he’s secretly involved with
someone else, just long enough to get her brother’s kidney.1 The
couple sets a date, and the kidney transplant takes place. Riding home
from the hospital, the groom-to-be announces the engagement is indefinitely postponed. A year later, he marries the other woman (p. 30).2
An American woman meets a Soviet man on a cultural exchange
program and, after he professes his love and proposes, she marries him.3
She spends the next three-and-a-half years working to help him immigrate to the United States, paying $15,000 in expenses and dedicating
approximately twenty hours per week to his immigration admin, delaying the completion of her doctorate and thus diminishing her income.4
After her husband’s successful immigration, she learns that he lied about
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. For helpful conversations and comments on earlier drafts, I thank Ian Ayres, Emily Benfer, Judson Brewer, Mathilde
Cohen, Yaron Covo, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Amy DiBona, Jens Frankenreiter, Kellen Funk, Jill
Hasday, Alexis J. Hoag, Bert Huang, Clare Huntington, Sarah Lawsky, Gillian Lester, Lev Menand,
Brian Richardson, Daniel Richman, Russell Robinson, Elizabeth Scott, Joshua Sealy-Harrington,
Rena Seltzer, Colleen Shanahan, Jane Spinak, Ilan Stein, Susan Sturm, Cass Sunstein, Kristen
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1 Complaint at 3–6, Dahl v. McNutt, No. C3-97-601906 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 26, 1997) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library).
2 For additional information on this case, see Dahl v. McNutt, No. C3-97-601906, slip op. at 1–
3, 12–13 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 1998); Man Took a Kidney, Broke a Heart but Won’t Be Sued,
SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 22, 1998), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=
19980122&slug=2730146 [https://perma.cc/C9CA-2GWL].
3 Gubin v. Lodisev, 494 N.W.2d 782, 783 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
4 Although immigration admin can be time-consuming, twenty hours per week might sound
excessive without these particulars: the Soviet government refused to grant him an exit visa, and
she undertook a public advocacy campaign, becoming a spokeswoman for the Divided Spouses
Coalition, an organization advocating for Soviets separated from their American spouses (pp. 80–
81). See generally Isabel Wilkerson, Group Working to Reunify Americans with Soviet Spouses,
N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 1987), https://nyti.ms/29zDXf4 [https://perma.cc/5MV4-D5ZG]. “Admin” is
the office-type work of life. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 GEO. L.J. 1409, 1419–21 (2015).
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his feelings and intentions; he was merely using her as a conduit to legal
immigration (pp. 80–81).5
An eighteen-year-old girl is in a debilitating car accident and spends
the next two years recuperating in her parents’ home.6 During that
time, she receives a $63,000 settlement check from the driver of the car,
which she entrusts to her father. Contrary to her mother’s report that
the money is “being held in an investment account for her benefit,”7 the
daughter learns later that her parents had spent $30,000 on themselves — which was the entire sum remaining after paying for her medical bills and car (p. 180).8
These plaintiffs’ accounts populate the pages of Professor Jill
Hasday’s Intimate Lies and the Law (pp. 30, 80–81, 180–81).9 And like
most of the plaintiffs discussed by Hasday, they lose in court.10
Not all of the book’s plaintiffs deserve to win. Some of the cases invite
debate. Consider the young woman whose parents spent the settlement
from her car accident. Even by her account, she waited nine years after
moving out before asking her parents about the money; her mother denies
ever saying the funds were being held in an investment account; and her
father says he understood the remainder after paying for her car and medical expenses to cover the reasonable costs of her room and board.11
Debating these cases could make for lively Thanksgiving dinner conversation — or exam hypos in Torts or Contracts.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
5 Gubin, 494 N.W.2d at 784 (“The plaintiff . . . devoted years . . . to bring[] him to the United
States . . . after which he promptly abandoned all pretense of having desired a marriage relationship
based upon love and affection. There is no other conclusion that can be drawn from this record
than that the defendant’s actions were a blatant and crass attempt to fraudulently induce the plaintiff to marry him for no other reason than to obtain . . . lawful entry into the United States.”).
6 Hanna v. Sheflin, 275 S.W.3d 423, 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
7 Id. at 428 n.5. Her mother denied ever saying this. Id. at 425, 428 n.5.
8 See id. at 425.
9 I have told the stories from the plaintiffs’ perspectives. For more on this choice, see infra note
63; for some aggregate information about the plaintiffs in the book, see infra note 30.
10 In Dahl v. McNutt (the kidney case), the Minnesota District Court dismissed all the claims
except the brother–kidney donor’s claim for lost wages and possible out-of-pocket costs of the surgery. No. C3-97-601906, slip op. at 22 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 1998). In Gubin v. Lodisev (the
Soviet immigration case), the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, finding that the
plaintiff couldn’t sustain a separate action for fraud apart from her divorce action, where all financial considerations should be dealt with. 494 N.W.2d at 784–85. The court reduced the damages
award of $113,087 to $76,687, id. at 785–86, and remanded for the lower court to determine whether
the remaining $76,687 could be “appropriately associated with a divorce action” instead of damages
for fraud, id. at 787. And in Hanna v. Sheflin (the young woman whose parents spent her car
accident settlement), the Tennessee Court of Appeals ruled that the three-year statute of limitations
on a conversion suit could not be tolled to cover the subsequent ten-year delay because she failed
to show that “her father took affirmative action to conceal her cause of action from her” and that
“she could not have discovered her cause of action despite exercising reasonable diligence.” 275
S.W.3d at 428.
11 See Hanna, 275 S.W.3d at 425–27.
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Hasday argues that many of these plaintiffs should, however, be winning or at least have a chance of winning. Which they would, she contends, if courts were treating these claims the same way courts treat
deception by non-intimates (pp. 200–10). Courts not only dismiss cases
involving intimate deception, sometimes overturning substantial jury
awards in a plaintiff’s favor, but also chide duped intimates for not being
more savvy, for not being vigilant enough to detect the deception (pp. 49,
76, 181).12 These courts seem to blame plaintiffs for trusting those they
love. One woman, whose husband lied to her to hide his bigamy, financial
misdeeds, and more, is quoted by Hasday as lamenting:
I trusted him, I believed in him, and yet I am branded ‘stupid’ for doing so.
On top of losing everything I own and facing a future raising three children
on my own, it is hard to know that society as a whole views me as some
kind of fool. (p. 92)13

Trust emerges as a potent subtheme in the book, but one which is incomplete. In this Review, I turn squarely to the subject of trust, drawing
on sources from psychology, philosophy, management theory, literature,
and diverse areas of law. After exploring dimensions of trust, I build out
a framework that combines affective trust (a feeling of safety) and
cognitive distrust (a willingness to doubt and inquire), later reframed as
epistemic curiosity (a drive to know14). Approaching intimate relationships with both affective trust and epistemic curiosity is no easy feat. An
appreciation of this, I argue, helps us to understand better Hasday’s proposals for reform, as well as to spur further legal innovations.
This Review has three parts. Part I aims to convey something of the
breadth and interest of Hasday’s fascinating new book, foregrounding
the role of gender and beginning to touch the subject of trust. Part II
delves briefly but widely into the theme of trust, which pervades the
book and invites further examination. Part III presents a framework
that combines affective trust and epistemic curiosity and applies this
framework to illuminate and sort Hasday’s proposals for reform; to critique a recent, dramatic change in the evidentiary treatment of marital
confidences; and to devise a novel approach to prenuptial agreements.
Throughout, this Review aims to engage and inspire the reader’s own
thinking. Together, we’ll make it worth your time. Trust me.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
12 For example, Hasday explains that “the Tennessee Court of Appeals blamed Hanna for not
promptly investigating her father, faulting this trusting daughter for not devoting more ‘care and
diligence’ to ‘discovering her father’s alleged conversion of the funds’” (p. 181) (quoting Hanna, 275
S.W.3d at 425).
13 The author quotes MARY TURNER THOMSON, THE BIGAMIST 234 (2008).
14 “Drive” here is meant colloquially, not technically, so it is not an embrace of one side of the
debate in the social science literature about whether curiosity is “drive.” See, e.g., Jordan Litman,
Curiosity: Nature, Dimensionality, and Determinants, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
MOTIVATION AND LEARNING 418, 418–19 (K. Ann Renninger & Suzanne E. Hidi eds., 2019).
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I. ESTABLISHING TRUST
To my loved ones. You did not inspire me to write this book.
— Jill Elaine Hasday, epigraph to Intimate Lies and the Law
Intimate Lies and the Law is thoroughly researched, analytically rigorous, and doctrinally pragmatic. The book is replete with fascinating
narratives and legal puzzles. These are features a reader of Hasday’s
work has come to expect. An added bonus is the text’s occasional humor, as in the epigraph.
The book should be of interest not only to those who study torts,
contracts, and family law. This comprehensive treatment should also
engage anyone interested in the psychology or sociology of intimacy. It
may even invite readers who want to understand their rights and obligations — and what to watch out for — in their relationships.
This Part of my Review highlights several of the book’s key contributions, describes its normative argument, and sets the stage for an examination of the theme of trust within and beyond intimate relationships.
A. Practice, Prohibition, and Prescription
Intimate Lies and the Law is a study of both the practice and the
law of intimate deception. Hasday thus derives her definition of intimate deception from a combination of legal and extralegal sources. Her
definition of “intimate” — meant to track how courts conceive of intimacy — “includes dates, sexual and/or romantic partners, and family
members such as spouses, parents, and children” (p. 6); it excludes
friends, therapists, and other professional relations. Hasday defines “deception” as “intentional acts or omissions . . . designed to make another
person believe something that the deceiver himself does not believe to
be true” (p. 7). Unlike her definition of “intimate,” Hasday’s definition
of “deception” is not tied to the law; instead, it is rooted in social science
literature (p. 7). Intimate deception, then, does not necessarily involve
a legal wrong.
Defining deception independent of court findings is important to
Hasday’s aims in the book. She writes, “Adopting a consistent definition
of deception that does not turn on whether a court has reached a legal
judgment that the defendant deceived the plaintiff allows me to capture
a fuller picture of how the law regulates intimate deception, including
by denying claims” (p. 7). This definition foreshadows the book’s concern with those who fall outside of the law’s protection.
The central legal drama Hasday presents is courts’ differential treatment of those who deceive their intimates and those who deceive anyone
else. As Hasday writes, “[A]n overriding premise that courts have
embraced in creating this body of law . . . [is] the assumption that people
deceived within intimate relationships do not and should not have access
to remedies that are available to people deceived in other contexts”
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(pp. 97–98). It is worth pausing over this statement, since it may be surprising. Courts treat deceived intimates less favorably, despite established
norms that we should trust intimates more. We will return to this point.
But first it is worth delving further into the question of who counts as an
intimate in these decisions, now that it is clearer what is at stake.
The boundaries of intimacy in these cases do not neatly track common expectations: romantic and sexual relationships are inside the circle
of intimacy, as are the relationships of children to parents; however,
other relationships that we commonly consider intimate do not garner
special treatment (that is, disfavor) in the courts. Thus, as Hasday presents these cases, courts permit parents to dupe their kids — even their
adult kids — but not the other way around (p. 173). And siblings can’t
dupe each other without consequence (pp. 191–93). By contrast, romantic relationships are a prime site for deception that goes unremedied.
And romantic relationships are defined very broadly. Intimate love, for
purposes of courts’ treatment of intimate deception, sweeps in people
who barely know each other (pp. 158–59).15
The ultimate aim of the book is to map what is happening in the
courts and to propose legal reforms. But before turning to the law, the
book draws on wide-ranging sources to help the reader understand the
context for these cases. Two chapters use social science to illuminate
the how and the why of such deception (pp. 27–76). A third sets out the
harsh consequences that can ensue (pp. 77–95). Then Hasday turns to
the history and analysis of the law that governs this arena (pp. 97–195).
The reasons for courts’ special treatment of intimate lies are multiple. The book offers a short history of the law of intimate deception,
focusing on three changes that have shaped the legal landscape. One is
shifting norms that mean courts look less favorably on cases rooted in
subordinating attitudes, for instance, cases involving a plaintiff who is
disappointed to learn the race of an intimate partner (pp. 116–24). According to Hasday, those claims have “virtually disappeared” (p. 121).16
A second change is the no-fault divorce revolution. According to
Hasday, the decline of fault divorce decreased the number of intimate
deception claims being brought — because proving fault was no longer
important to getting a divorce — and also led some courts to be less
sympathetic to intimate deception claims on the grounds that changing
divorce laws expressed a policy against entertaining such arguments in
court (pp. 128–33).
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
15 Hasday describes a case, for example, involving a woman who sought child support for a fake
pregnancy after a brief sexual relationship resulting in financial losses and emotional distress, which
a court referred to as the “messy aftermath that all too often follows casual sexual encounters and
failed romances” and declined to involve itself in (p. 159) (quoting Starr v. Woolf, No. C047594,
2005 WL 1532369, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2005) (emphasis added)).
16 For further discussion, see infra note 127 and accompanying text.
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The third, the decline of the so-called heart balm torts,17 involves
complex gender dynamics (pp. 110–16) and raises interesting questions
about what stories people want to hear and whom they trust to tell those
stories. This is the subject of the next section.
B. The Rise and Fall of Intimate Deception Claims, or,
Itchy Palms and Aching Hearts
The fate of suits for breach of promise to marry might seem a rare
context where the law of intimate deception is easy to explain: anti–
heart balm statutes preclude the suits at issue. But as with the other
narratives in the book, the legal story gets complicated in court. Courts
have interpreted these anti–heart balm statutes so broadly that cases
that have even a whiff of engagement inspire courts to refuse recovery
(p. 110) — including cases where the parties were merely romantically
involved but not engaged (p. 112); where the parties actually married,
so no breach of promise to marry even occurred (pp. 111–12); and even
where the alleged romantic partner was entirely fabricated through an
elaborate ruse set up to deceive (pp. 110–11, 115–16).
The history here makes good reading, and Hasday is both engaging
and parsimonious in the telling. Essentially, before the 1930s, these torts
offered means for duped intimates to recover for their injuries (p. 101).
Breach of promise to marry suits didn’t require the jilted woman to
prove whether the man deceived her about his intentions or merely
changed his mind; either way she could recover (p. 101). From 1935
onward, states began passing laws to prohibit these tort suits — starting
with Indiana and New York and, by the end of the twentieth century,
including a majority of states (pp. 104–07).
Key campaigners included women. Roberta West Nicholson,
Indiana’s only female legislator, led the charge (p. 104). She “insisted
that the women suing for breach of promise or seduction were fraudsters
with fabricated claims designed to extract money from wealthy men” —
hiding their “itching palms in the guise of aching hearts” (p. 105).18
Nicholson urged other women to run for the state legislature to support
her anti–heart balm bill, which, she asserted, “protected wives and feminine members of the family of men who suffered from the often unfounded blackmailing machinations of unscrupulous women” (p. 105).19
According to Nicholson, “‘[S]elf-respecting women’ did not bring heart
balm actions” (p. 105).20
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
17 Heart balm torts, as Hasday defines them, consist of four main causes of action: “breach of
promise to marry, seduction, criminal conversation, and alienation of affections” (p. 100).
18 The author quotes Aching Hearts Are Itching Palms, Says Woman Legislator as Men Gallantly
Pass “Love Bill,” INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Feb. 1, 1935, pt.1, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
19 The author quotes More Women for Assembly Asked, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Feb. 13, 1935,
at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20 The author quotes Aching Hearts Are Itching Palms, Says Woman Legislator as Men Gallantly
Pass “Love Bill,” supra note 18, at 1.
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The public apparently trusted Nicholson more than the plaintiffs she
critiqued, although not everyone bought into these types of accounts (p.
106). Hasday has found no evidence to vindicate that trust (p. 105). Nor
is evidence available to support the claims of New York State Senator
John McNaboe, sponsor of the second anti–heart balm statute passed in
1935, that “the law was targeting ‘a tribute of $10,000,000 paid annually
by New York men to gold-diggers and blackmailers’ and . . . that ‘[n]ine
out of ten recent breach of promise suits have been of the racketeer
type’” (p. 107).21
As a woman crusader for laws banning heart balm torts, Roberta
West Nicholson was neither unusual nor eccentric. Her politically varied female compatriots included, among others, Eleanor Roosevelt.
“When she spoke in support of New York’s anti–heart balm bill a few
days before the governor signed it into law,” Hasday recounts, “the First
Lady told reporters: ‘I don’t think anyone who was really hurt would
ever sue’” (p. 108).22
The campaigns against the heart balm torts reflected a convergence
of interests23 that may look, at least to modern eyes, bleak if not simply
ugly.24 Men who want to protect themselves or each other from women
who might reasonably have a claim to recourse, on the one hand, converge with women who don’t want to associate with the kind of women
so dependent on men (that is, so willing to admit their dependency and
vulnerability) that they would bring a lawsuit for disappointed expectations of care and protection, on the other (pp. 107–10). The latter group
aligns women concerned with sex equality and women concerned with
morality in their shared suspicion of those women who dare to invite
the state, and the public gaze, into their intimate lives.
The sense of women’s relative dependence is an uncomfortable
thread, often surfacing in the opinions only subtly. Occasionally, though,
disparagement of women’s injuries was more obvious. The case of
Gring v. Lerch25 is exemplary. Gring involved a woman whose fiancé
discovered she was unable to perform the “sexual ‘duties of a wife’” due
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
21 The author quotes Move Planned in 8 Other States, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1935, at 3 (alteration in original).
22 The author quotes Law Banning Heart-Balm Suits Wins Approval of First Lady, WASH.
POST, Mar. 26, 1935, at 2.
23 Cf. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (“The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will
be accommodated only when it converges with the interest of whites.”).
24 Even some contemporaries viewed it as such (p. 106) (quoting Indiana State Senator William
Dennigan, an opponent of Nicholson’s anti–heart balm bill, as asking, “Do you mean to tell me you
will help women by taking away their civil rights against philanderers and men who prey upon
them?” (citation omitted)).
25 112 Pa. 244 (1886).
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to “‘a physical incapacity’” in the form of “an unusually ‘thickened
hymen’” (p. 125).26 In the court’s words,
A man does not court and marry a woman for the mere pleasure of paying
for her board and washing. He expects and is entitled to something in
return, and if the woman with whom he contracts be incapable by reason
of a natural impediment of giving him the comfort and satisfaction to which
as a married man he would be entitled, there is a failure of the moving
consideration of such contract, and no court ought to enforce it by giving
damages for its breach. (p. 125)27

Elsewhere the court observed, “It would be a fraud to sell a cow with such
a defect without making it known to the purchaser. . . . He was entitled
to have a wife capable of copulation in the usual way when he married
her.”28 In Hasday’s telling, Gring exemplifies one earlier thread casting
women as property, whether as farm animals or as objects (p. 125).
This older way of speaking about women, Hasday explains, is later
replaced by rhetoric endorsing women’s equality and independence (pp.
126–27).29 Though salutary at a structural level, this change is at best
mixed for individual plaintiffs, some of whom were surely benefiting from
the pity or chivalry of courts toward their position as the weaker sex.
Women are the principal losers in this story. The plaintiffs who seek
vindication in court for the lies that cost them money, time, and dignity
are often women.30 Hasday does not hide this fact. She adverts to it
throughout, and the book’s cover features a bride and groom dressed in
wedding garb, with his fingers crossed behind his back. But at key summary moments she embraces gender-neutral language, referring to “deceived intimates” and seeming to avoid pronouns (p. 202).31 She acknowledges but treads lightly around the gendered dimensions of the story.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
26
27
28
29

The author quotes id. at 245.
The author quotes id. at 250.
Id. at 249.
One example Hasday cites for this changing rhetoric is the case of Singh v. Singh, 611 N.E.2d
347 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), in which the Ohio Court of Appeals denied a man recovery in the name
of rejecting the oppressive regime of arranged marriages (pp. 127–28). This case did not evidence
the particular gender dynamic I describe in the text, as this suit involved a man whose recovery
was denied.
30 A superficial count of the cases Hasday discusses finds that women make up sixty-four percent of the plaintiffs in the cases where Hasday gives enough detail to discern the gender of the
plaintiff and that cases in which a woman sues a man make up sixty-seven percent of the cases with
enough detail to discern the gender of both the plaintiff and the defendant. This count excludes
the parentage cases involving a deceiver lying to a partner about being the parent and the criminal
cases because the prosecutor there (the state) is genderless. Cases with both female and male coplaintiffs or co-defendants are also not included in the count. My thanks to Julia Oksasoglu for
performing this tally. Note that there is of course no reason to assume that these represent the
landscape of all cases filed or decided in any given period; it merely gives a sense of the gender
breakdown in the cases Hasday includes and discusses in sufficient detail.
31 Hasday explains that “[l]egal acknowledgement and legitimation of such arguments — after
a long history in which the law discounted and dismissed the claims of deceived intimates and
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Many male plaintiffs populate these pages as well,32 so Hasday consciously chooses not to foreground the theme of gender (p. 7). This is understandable, but the whole dilemma also highlights an interesting point
about gender and authorship: the book looks quite different if gender is the
headline. (Imagine a book called Deceived Women and the Law — or even
Gender, Lies, and the Law — rather than Intimate Lies and the Law.) And
the author of such a book arguably looks different — more emotional,
more partial, less serious, perhaps even, to some readers, less trustworthy.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,33 the Supreme Court described the
pressure to be masculine and feminine at the same time as “an intolerable and impermissible catch 22.”34 As Professor Kenji Yoshino has suggested, though this bind may be unfair, it is far from unusual.35 This is
the bind that many women (and non-women) confront regularly: if they
are working or performing in a professional sphere designed for men or
evaluated by men, they may be judged by masculine standards of performance while also being expected to maintain certain standards of
femininity. The Court makes this bind sound impossible but, despite its
unfairness, one way or another, many people (often women) manage this
bind effectively.36 Those presenting feminist ideas perhaps face a parallel bind, one that Hasday, like many writers before her, has navigated
successfully.
C. A Paradox of Prevalence?
The gender frame might lead us to expect courts to dismiss these
claims of intimate deception as trivial. This is indeed what Hasday had
anticipated finding in her study:
I began this project suspecting that courts might deny remedies to deceived
intimates out of a belief that intimate deception is insufficiently important
to merit judicial concern. But judges deciding intimate deception cases often appear convinced that this regulatory arena is vitally important. More
specifically, judges seem to think that it is crucial to govern intimate deception in ways that maintain and reinforce current norms and practices in
courtship, sexual relationships, and marriage. (p. 157)

By Hasday’s account, courts view these matters not as too trivial to
address but, in a sense, as too important. And, she adds, with her subtle
humor, “Courts are intent on upholding the status quo in intimacy,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
blamed them for being duped — can be important to plaintiffs whose injuries are taken seriously
and whose deceivers are held accountable. Such recognition can also be uplifting to deceived intimates who never sue” (p. 202; see also pp. 6, 87).
32 See supra note 30 (discussing the gender makeup of the cases).
33 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
34 Id. at 251 (plurality opinion).
35 See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING 157 (2006) (describing “[t]he plurality’s Catch-22 theory”
as “naïve”).
36 Id.
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although they never quite explain why the status quo is worth protecting
so fiercely if deceit is as common in intimate relationships as judges
assume” (p. 157). Court decisions seem to Hasday to rest on the importance of protecting people’s ability to lie without consequence to their
intimates — a practice some courts suggest is widespread (p. 156).37
The wide-ranging and interesting data in the book’s chapters on the
social science of deception support the perception that such deceit is
common. Two interrelated threads may help us to understand courts’
reactions to these cases: First, people generally subscribe to a “truth default,”38 assuming what they’re told is true (pp. 53–54). Second, romantic relationships frequently involve deception — on the front end, when
people lie to lure others into relationships; and in the middle and back
end, when people lie to keep others in relationships or to cover their
violation of monogamy norms (pp. 28–32).39
Perhaps courts’ rejection of such claims, then, stems from the ubiquity of the deceit. Its frequency may normalize it, making it almost
invisible to courts. An invisibility account seems plausible on its face
but would not explain the harsh words courts apply to those betrayed
by their intimates.40 Perhaps, then, judges push these cases out of court
because they don’t want to see the possibility of such deception in their
own intimate lives. This explanation could help answer for courts’ criticism of plaintiffs. This is a familiar dynamic: outsiders shunning and
judging harshly those who fall prey to any common calamity, wanting
to distance themselves.
Writing in a different context, I used the term paradox of prevalence
to describe the social norms surrounding nonmonogamy.41 The starting
point of that piece was a puzzle at the beginning of this century: even
while same-sex marriage was being hotly debated, most everyone on
both sides of the political spectrum agreed that multiparty relationships
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
37 As Hasday describes it, “Judges start by presuming that deceit pervades romance, sex, and
marriage, and they contend with little — if any — explanation that courts should accordingly protect commonplace intimate deception from legal redress” (p. 156) (emphasis added).
38 Hasday uses the phrase “truth bias” to describe this concept (pp. 53–54). I use the more
common phrase “truth default.” See sources cited infra note 68.
39 Hasday explains that “deceit can be central to intimate relationships and can secure crucial
benefits for deceivers” (p. 28).
40 See supra note 12. Another interesting gloss on these cases would draw on the recent work
of Roseanna Sommers finding that the commonsense lay perception of consent is that it is compatible with fraud. See Roseanna Sommers, Commonsense Consent, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 5) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). Fascinating as this finding is, it
wouldn’t help explain why courts treat intimate deception differently from non-intimate deception — nor would it answer for courts’ criticism of those duped by their intimates.
41 Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence,
29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 284 (2004) (arguing that a “paradox of prevalence” governs
our legal and social norms surrounding nonmonogamy).
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were beyond the pale.42 Those on the political right used the spectre of
polygamy to threaten a parade of horribles that would follow from lifting the sex restriction on marriage; those on the left agreed such a parade
would be horrible but disputed the link to same-sex marriage.43 The
sweeping opposition to multiparty relationships seemed all the more
puzzling given that, based on any available statistics, nonmonogamy in
the form of adultery was fairly common.44 If nonmonogamy was so
common, why would people so roundly oppose open, honest, consensual
nonmonogamy — sometimes called “polyamory”? This I called a paradox of prevalence.45 I suggested that the pervasiveness of nonmonogamy meant that open polyamory was all the more threatening, as it
forced people to confront the risk of something in their own lives that
they didn’t want to see.46
At an individual level, this dynamic is akin to homophobia,47 or,
more generally, the psychological phenomenon of projection, in which
people attribute their own unwanted feelings onto others.48 But the
paradox of prevalence takes into account fears about one’s relationship — rather than one’s internal self — fears that are stirred up by
awareness of the statistical probability of betrayal.
A similar dynamic may help fuel distrust of women and others who
bring claims of intimate deception. Courts, anti–heart balm campaigners,
and others may prefer to distance themselves from the possibility of deception, so statistically common, by shunning those who try to bring it to light.
This is an interesting hypothesis and may well capture part of the
dynamic at work in these cases. The next section contemplates a more
practical problem for the courts.
D. Trusting Courts
Judges contemplating complaints of intimate deception must face
this concern: the possibility that allowing these suits will open the courts
to complicated cases brought by disappointed lovers seeking revenge
through the legal system.
This concern lies at the intersection of two lines of argument. The first
argument relates to the difficulty of determining fault. The heart balm
torts have been criticized on the same basis that fault-based divorce was
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 279–83.
Id. at 279–80.
Id. at 297–300.
Id. at 284.
Id.
See id. at 345–46 (discussing homophobia).
See, e.g., ANNA FREUD, 2 THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENCE 122 (Cecil
Baines trans., rev. ed. 1966); SIGMUND FREUD, THE ORIGINS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 111 (Maria
Bonaparte, Anna Freud & Ernst Kris eds., Eric Mosbacher & James Strachey trans., 1954).
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criticized: it can be very hard to discern who is the wrongdoer in an intimate relationship (pp. 107, 130–31).49 This critique of the heart balm torts
could apply more broadly to claims for deception in the intimate sphere
as well. As others have observed, where the frame of a relationship is
intimacy, complex dynamics shielded from the public eye are likely to be
not only present but central (p. 49). Of course, courts decide all kinds of
difficult matters, so this is not to say such resolution is impossible, or to
assert any definite conclusion about it. The point is merely that such a
concern is a reasonable one, grounded in related debates.
The second argument dovetails with the first: though a legal regime
helps to shape spheres of human interaction through both intervention
and non-intervention, the right to bring a civil suit is a powerful weapon
that one individual can wield against another, whether or not the suit is
successful. Appreciating this argument requires taking a step back to
understand the frame better.
In principle, dismissing suits for intimate deception is a form of regulatory influence, just as vindicating such suits is a form of regulatory
influence. In either case, the law is structuring human relationships,
either by effecting a legal entitlement to be free from intimate deception
or by effecting a legal entitlement to deceive an intimate without consequence. Important scholarship on the regulatory state has illuminated
the reality that both government action and inaction structure our lives
and our rights.50 This work has informed writing, for instance, about
the ways that the state structures and shapes who forms intimate relationships with whom51 — including by declining to remedy the legacy
of race-based redlining of neighborhoods (and implementing federal
benefits programs in ways that shape who can afford which neighborhoods);52 or by declining to enforce federal disability law’s requirement
that public accommodations be accessible to people with disabilities.53
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
49 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1225, 1296–97 (1998) (critiquing fault-based divorces).
50 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 197 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 888–90 (1987).
51 See, e.g., RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE
AND ROMANCE 119 (2001); Russell K. Robinson, Structural Dimensions of Romantic Preferences,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2787, 2788 (2008); Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s
Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1311 (2009).
52 See, e.g., IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD
HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 10–13, 142–72
(2005); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 177–93 (2017); Samuel Nye Winslow, A House Is Not
a Home for Everybody: Ameliorating the Effects of America’s Racially Discriminatory 20th Century Housing Policies (Sept. 21, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
53 Emens, supra note 51, at 1380–81, 1392–93.
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If only some people can live or travel or dine in some spaces, then only
those people will meet, connect, fall in love, and marry.54 Even though
law does not affirmatively tell us whom to marry, law does shape our
choices in this most private sphere.
When reading Intimate Lies and the Law, I was persuaded that our
legal system is in a similar way regulating the sphere of intimate deception. By declining to vindicate suits brought by individuals deceived by
their intimates, courts are protecting one vision of intimate relationships.
As Hasday writes, in a passage quoted earlier, “[J]udges seem to think
that it is crucial to govern intimate deception in ways that maintain and
reinforce current norms and practices in courtship, sexual relationships,
and marriage” (p. 157). And later, she observes that “the law always
and inescapably regulates our intimate lives, whether courts side with
plaintiffs or defendants in litigation over injuries stemming from intimate deception” (p. 211).
This is right. And yet it does not fully capture the practical significance of an alternative civil regime in which individuals can more readily bring the power of the state to bear on each other by filing lawsuits.
The act-omission distinction may be a philosophical fallacy and thus a
“moral heuristic” in principle.55 But in the context of civil suits, the
ability to file a lawsuit is a powerful weapon that does not exist if such
a suit is disallowed or discouraged.
The context of government regulation is different, in much the way
that civil rights law made through impact litigation spearheaded by organized coalitions of advocates is different from civil rights law made
through self-initiated suits filed by particular aggrieved plaintiffs.56
When writing about intimate discrimination, I implicitly recognized this
divide, as I urged regulatory reforms to the structural and background
features that shape our intimate lives, but rejected the idea of allowing
new individual lawsuits to remedy the problem.57 I drew on the teaching of Professor Robert Ellickson — who used to tell his students (of
which I was one) that “love triangles” are “much overrepresented” in the
cases that make it to court58 — to argue that “widely authorizing
discrimination-based heartbalm lawsuits would be truly perverse, as it
would invite nearly every love triangle into court without even the need
for a nexus with an independent legal issue.”59 The multifarious costs
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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55

Id. at 1379–82.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556, 1581–
85 (2004).
56 See William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1624–26 (1997).
57 Emens, supra note 51, at 1383–85.
58 Id. at 1384 & n.351 (citations omitted) (quoting Ellickson).
59 Id. at 1384.
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of litigation would of course prevent many such suits, as I noted there60
and as Hasday also observes when offering her arguments against this
kind of “floodgates” reasoning (pp. 212–13).61 What I failed to mention
is that the mere threat of litigation can itself be a powerful weapon, and
one which bears few if any of those costs.
Thus, one further reason these plaintiffs may lose is a concern from
courts about limiting access to the weaponry of civil suits. This suggests
the need for a limiting principle on any reform meant to expand access
to such remedies. In Part III, I will present a framework that is reflected
in several of Hasday’s proposals for reform — and that can also offer
such a limiting principle.
***
Gender is a significant theme in Intimate Lies and the Law, as this
Part has highlighted. But this is far from a story about courts refusing
to recognize only women’s injuries in law. Men get duped and denied
remedies as well. Recall the brother of the disappointed bride who gave
his kidney so his sister would “never want for anything.”62 The bride’s
brother, John Dahl, went through an excruciating experience. The man
needing a kidney (Richard McNutt) had been dating Dahl’s sister
(Dorothy Zauhar), but had grown colder to her when the hospital concluded she was medically prohibited from donating a kidney.63 On
meeting Zauhar’s brother, McNutt warmed up again — eventually persuading Dahl to be the donor.64 After the surgery, Dahl had an adverse
reaction to morphine and endured a painful recovery with no painkillers.65 Although McNutt promised Dahl a life insurance policy in his
name, the policy was never delivered.66 And other cases involve men
whose losses do not depend on women’s harms (pp. 141, 158–59, 217),
so they cannot be explained away through a gender-by-association story.
A central problem for Mr. Dahl and his sister plagues these cases:
how much should you ask an intimate to substantiate their story, and
how much inquiry or research should you conduct to verify or challenge
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
60 Id. at 1384 n.351 (citing Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1139–51 (2008)). It is worth noting too the inequities that would result from limiting cases
through litigation costs. See source cited infra note 208 and accompanying text. Hasday recognizes
these concerns about access to justice, while observing that they are not unique to this context (p. 212).
61 Hasday also believes that the number of cases will be limited because of the embarrassment
associated with bringing such suits and the limits of a civil regime that prioritizes physical and
financial injuries over emotional ones (pp. 212–13).
62 Complaint at 4, Dahl v. McNutt, No. C3-97-601906 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 26, 1997) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library) (quoting defendant Richard H. McNutt).
63 Id. at 3. As elsewhere, these facts are as represented by the plaintiff, since most of these
plaintiffs lose as a matter of law.
64 Id. at 4.
65 Id. at 5.
66 Id.
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it? We’re not very good at detecting lies (p. 52).67 Our truth default is
adaptive, argues Professor Timothy Levine, because we couldn’t function very well if we spent our time doubting and researching everything
anyone ever told us.68 And yet, Hasday reveals, the law expects us to
do precisely that in our intimate relationships. These questions of trust,
and expecting the worst, are the subject of Part II.
II. TRACING DIMENSIONS OF TRUST AND DISTRUST
One cause for wariness about legal arguments faulting deceived intimates for being overly trusting is that the law governing deception outside
of intimacy is often more protective of the credulous — recognizing that
such people are more likely to be duped, essentially by definition. . . . The
law often views the fact that a deceiver preyed on a trusting person as a
strike against the deceiver, not his exoneration.
— Jill Elaine Hasday (p. 50)69
Hasday diagnoses a legal regime that expects intimates to anticipate
the worst. Trusting your intimates, who then later deceive you, leads to
disappointment in love, and then disappointment again in court.
Hasday argues for a new regime that would instead vindicate the losses
of those individuals who trust their intimates, at least to the degree that
non-intimates’ losses are vindicated when their trust is disappointed
(p. 197, 200). She proposes a rebuttable presumption in favor of treating
intimates who bring claims based on deception the same way as nonintimates bringing similar claims (p. 200).
Hasday’s sympathies are plainly with the deceived. More broadly, she
prefers a legal regime that supports and rewards trust among intimates:
No one should be faulted or legally penalized for acting as an ordinary person would and trusting his intimates. Both human psychology and social
norms push us toward such trust, and faith in our intimates can help foster
human flourishing, caregiving, cooperation, and social bonds. The law
should neither expect nor desire the end of trust within intimacy (p. 231).

Trust is thus an important theme here. Hasday does not foreground the
term, though, and therefore does not define it.
How one defines trust depends on the focus, as trust encompasses
vastly different phenomena. Dimensions include the object of the trust
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
67 Hasday describes the “[v]olumes of social science research spanning decades [that] find that
the odds that a person will accurately assess whether a speaker is being honest or lying hover only
slightly above chance” (p. 52).
68 See, e.g., Timothy R. Levine, Truth-Default Theory (TDT): A Theory of Human Deception
and Deception Detection, 33 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 378, 378–79 (2014); see also
MALCOLM GLADWELL, TALKING TO STRANGERS 53–106 (2019).
69 In the ellipsis span, Hasday cites to United States v. Brown, 147 F.3d 477, 480–82, 487 (6th
Cir. 1998); United States v. Jackson, 95 F.3d 500, 507–08 (7th Cir. 1996); 139 CONG. REC. 27,645
(1993) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch); id. at 18,057–59 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (p. 50 n.4).
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(who or what is being trusted); the relevant time (whether trust concerns
a positive or predictive matter); the scope of the trust (whether trust is
absolute or qualified70); the direction of the trust (whether it is unidirectional or multidirectional); and the content (the what of the trust71). To
understand the last, consider that you might trust someone to drive you
somewhere, but not fly you to the same destination; one person to remove your tooth, but not to prepare your taxes.72
Definitions that reflect the object, time, and directional dimensions
are, for example, “the mutual confidence that no party to an exchange
will exploit the other’s vulnerability”73 and “choosing to risk making
something you value vulnerable to another person’s actions.”74 Both of
these definitions seem to focus on the relationship to one other person,
with an eye toward future behavior. By contrast, the following definition from Esther Perel demonstrates that trust can also be a more foundational orientation of the individual: “Trust is also our ability to live
with what we will never know.”75
Perel’s definition also begins to point toward a central division I explore here: the cognitive (thinking) as opposed to the affective (feelings).
Set against two rubrics along the time dimension, aspects of the affective
and the cognitive can be mapped as follows:

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
70
71

Cf., e.g., Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 534–35 (1995).
This is related to a form of trust sometimes called “confidence.” See, e.g., Michael Siegrist,
Trust and Risk Perception: A Critical Review of the Literature, RISK ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 4), https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13325 [https://perma.cc/TX4J-QJ3W] (“[C]onfidence
is based on past experiences or evidence suggesting that future events will occur as expected.”).
72 These examples were inspired by Adam Grant, How to Trust People You Don’t Like, WorkLife with Adam Grant at 05:56, TED (March 2018), https://www.ted.com/talks/
worklife_with_adam_grant_how_to_trust_people_you_don_t_like [https://perma.cc/6M4B-SDCK].
73 Charles F. Sabel, Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a Volatile Economy,
46 HUM. REL. 1133, 1133 (1993).
74 CHARLES FELTMAN, THE THIN BOOK OF TRUST 7 (2009) (emphasis omitted).
75 Aly Weisman & Kristen Griffin, A Relationship Expert Explains “the Most Important Element in a Relationship,” BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 5, 2016, 10:40 AM), https://www.
businessinsider.com/most-important-thing-in-relationships-2016-1 [https://perma.cc/QZ2Y-RYQD]
(quoting Esther Perel).
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Table 1: Matrix of Two Central Aspects of Trust
Cognitive
Positive

A belief in the current
facts as given

Predictive

A belief that things will
turn out ok

Affective
A feeling of safety and security in a particular environment or relationship in this
moment
An emotional security that
things will turn out ok

The aim at this point is not to select among these definitions or dimensions, but to set the stage for inquiry into the nature and meanings of
trust. Trust, as we shall see, presents particular puzzles for the work of
lawyers and researchers, as well as among intimates.
To set up the framework I offer in Part III, this Part traces several
themes and excavates important perspectives on both trust and distrust,
including what builds trust; which sources we should trust; who gets to
trust and be trusted; who is expected to distrust; and, finally, what kind
of trust is expected of romantic partners. This Part reaches far beyond
the realm of intimate deception or even of intimate relationships. The
aim here is to delve broadly into the subject of trust, both to begin to
understand this rich field and to lay the groundwork for the framework
presented in the next Part and its application to Hasday’s proposals and
other legal contexts.
A. Who Believes the Universe Is a Friendly Place?
The most important decision we make is whether we believe we live
in a friendly or hostile universe.
— attributed to Albert Einstein76
The quotation in the epigraph came into my mind while reading
Hasday’s Intimate Lies and the Law. I remembered hearing it attributed
to Einstein in more than one yoga class. The words are recited in that
context, I gather, not to suggest the possibility of an alien invasion. Rather, these words — assigned to a figure widely trusted for his brilliance —
invite the listener to cultivate trust in place of anxiety or worry.77
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
76 Liz Sterling, Is It a Friendly Universe?, HUFFPOST (June 17, 2012, 9:18 AM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/positive-thinking_b_1590903 [https://perma.cc/3JAF-ZA9V]. For
more on the attribution, see infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
77 Trust here is meant more in the affective sense of feeling safe, rather than the ideological sense
of, for instance, believing in a just world. Cf. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Belief in a Just World
and Redistributive Politics 1–2, 24–26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11208,
2005), https://www.nber.org/papers/w11208.pdf [https://perma.cc/89SZ-27AD] (proposing a model
distinguishing an “American” equilibrium with high belief in a just world, motivation to work, and
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Remembering this line led me to question whether it was really said
by Einstein. And then to ask the reference librarians if they could find
the source of the quotation — whether from Einstein or elsewhere.78
They sent back two conclusions: the line is frequently attributed to
Einstein, and yet the source is almost certainly not Einstein. (For those
who are interested, this was most likely the poet and philologist F.W.H.
Myers’s answer to a question, possibly asked by Matthew Arnold, about
what question he’d most like answered.79) This is far from the only
wrongly attributed quotation-from-yoga-class.80
How does it feel to be the person at the yoga class seeking to debunk
the quotation attributions? Not great. This is generally not why you
came to yoga: to feel skeptical and doubting. Yet it happens to the best
of us. (And perhaps this response is apt, although unpleasant, when
what’s offered is untrue.)
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
laissez-faire policies, from a “European” equilibrium characterized by skepticism about whether effort
is rewarded, less motivation to work, and a more robust welfare state; and drawing on the distinction
between affect and belief); Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, Just World Research and the Attribution
Process: Looking Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1030, 1030 (1978) (“Individuals have a need
to believe that they live in a world where people generally get what they deserve.”).
78 I framed my question as, “Would it be possible to find the source of this line attributed to
Einstein?”
79 One retelling is as follows:
An interesting story has been told of the friendship of Matthew Arnold, the English poet
and critic, and F.W.H. Myers, the philosopher and spiritualist. They had been conversing
about man’s place in the universe, when suddenly Arnold turned to Myers and asked, “If
you were permitted to ask one question of the Sphinx, with the assurance that a correct
answer would be given, what question would you ask?” After a moment’s reflection
Myers replied, “I should ask, ‘Is the universe friendly?’”
J. SUTHERLAND BONNELL, FIFTH AVENUE SERMONS 1 (1936). Whether or not this is Matthew
Arnold is subject to doubt, even from Bonnell, who wrote, “Whether this anecdote be true or not I
cannot say. Frankly, I have my doubts about many of these tag ends of biography.” Id.
Another source is EMIL CARL WILM, THE PROBLEM OF RELIGION 114 n.1 (1912):
A friend proposed to the late F.W.H. Myers the following question: “What is the thing
which above all others you would like to know? If you could ask the Sphinx one question,
and only one, what would the question be?” After a moment’s silence Myers replied: “I
think it would be this: Is the universe friendly?”
Thank you to Marty Witt and especially to Nam Jin Yoon for a deep dive to try to find the source
of this line.
80 Another is the line frequently misattributed to Holocaust survivor Viktor Frankl: “Between
stimulus and response there is a space. In that space is our power to choose our response. In our
response lies our growth and our freedom.” See, e.g., Victor E. Frankl Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE,
https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/viktor_e_frankl_160380
[https://perma.cc/8PVB-3D9C]
(misattributing the quote to Frankl). It looks like that line is possibly from self-help author Stephen
Covey, or maybe from an unidentified book he once saw in Hawai‘i, or from some other source —
but in any case not from Frankl. See Franz J. Vesely, Alleged Quote, VIKTOR FRANKL INSTITUT,
https://www.univie.ac.at/logotherapy/quote_stimulus.html [https://perma.cc/V3EM-T45V] (noting
that the quotation is attributed to Frankl and referring readers to Stephen Covey’s account of finding the quote in an unidentified source); see also Between Stimulus and Response There Is a Space.
In That Space Is Our Power To Choose Our Response, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Feb. 18, 2018),
https://quoteinvestigator.com/2018/02/18/response [https://perma.cc/22FM-GP5R].
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I suspect that many readers of this Review know something about
what it’s like to be the resident debunker. Lawyers, academics, and those
training to be lawyers and academics have a special relationship to distrust. Lawyers are often expected to be the people in the room who anticipate and guard against or neutralize the bad things that might happen.
And academics are researchers who dig to get to the bottom of things,
rather than trusting the first explanation or claim they encounter. Trust
seems like a good thing, but the special need for distrust for both lawyers
and researchers highlights the virtues, in some contexts, of distrust.
B. Trust and the Inner Researcher, or, Self-Trust
The other terror that scares us from self-trust is our consistency; a
reverence for our past act or word because the eyes of others have no
other data for computing our orbit than our past acts, and we are loath
to disappoint them. . . . A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little
minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. . . .
Speak what you think now in hard words and to-morrow speak what tomorrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every thing you
said to-day.
— Ralph Waldo Emerson81
Researchers and scholars must distrust superficial answers. And they
must be prepared to do the work to reach further. This raises the question
of which facts to trust and how to decide — and whom to tell. Strenuous
research and reporting may also require a certain kind of trust, then: in
the researcher’s own methods, observations, and conclusions.
To trust one’s own perceptions sometimes involves a radical rejection
of the facts or norms accepted by others or even one’s earlier self (as in
the epigraph from Emerson). We might think here of Galileo’s finding
that the sun revolves around the earth — or of those who call out forms
of injustice that have gone unseen or unchallenged. A dramatic example
of a researcher trusting her own perceptions and risking reputational
consequences comes from Barbara Ehrenreich, in her 2016 book Living
with a Wild God.82 Trained as a scientist,83 Ehrenreich is best known
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
81 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance (1841), in NATURE AND SELECTED ESSAYS
175, 182–83 (Penguin Classics 2003). He continues: “‘Ah, so you shall be sure to be misunderstood.’ — Is it so bad then to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates,
and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit
that ever took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood.” Id. at 183.
82 BARBARA EHRENREICH, LIVING WITH A WILD GOD 115–16 (2016) [hereinafter
EHRENREICH, WILD GOD].
83 On her Ph.D. in cellular immunology from Rockefeller University, see, for example, Lucy
Rock, When Do You Know You’re Old Enough to Die? Barbara Ehrenreich Has Some Answers,
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2018, 6:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2018/apr/
07/barbara-ehrenreich-natural-causes-book-old-enough-to-die [https://perma.cc/2WYN-BFW2].
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for hard-hitting journalism like Nickel and Dimed,84 which was based
on her three-month experiment living on minimum-wage jobs like waitress, hotel maid, and healthcare aid, among others.85 Ehrenreich has
described herself as “a myth buster by trade.”86
In Living with a Wild God, Ehrenreich recounts her experience as a
young person in the desert seeing what appeared to be a vision of everything in flames.87 She buried these memories for decades, not risking
others’ reactions.88 “For most of the intervening years,” she writes, “my
general thought has been: If there are no words for it, then don’t say anything about it.”89 What she says next begins to convey her self-consciousness about sharing this kind of experience, her appreciation of the norms
she was violating and expectations she was disappointing: “Otherwise you
risk slopping into ‘spirituality,’ which is, in addition to being a crime
against reason, of no more interest to other people than your dreams.”90
For many years, she distrusted her readers and protected her status as a
trustworthy narrator by hiding parts of her experience.
Although she kept these memories to herself, Ehrenreich saved the
contemporaneous journals in which she described them, out of some
sense that her inner researcher must stay true to the events as she experienced them — she couldn’t destroy the facts as they came to her.91
The book recounts her decision finally to expose these memories to the
world, despite the doubts she would face, not only of her story but of
her self. She chose to risk losing her readers’ trust in favor of her own
perceptions.92
Even the boldest of thinkers may choose not to risk his reputation by
sharing ideas he trusts but expects the world will not. Jeremy Bentham’s
writings about same-sex sex are a relevant example. Bentham couldn’t
figure out any reason, under a principle of utility, for punishing sex with
a person of the same sex.93 But he declined to share his writings on the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
84
85
86

BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED (2001).
Id. at 9.
Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class at 08:12, BOOKNOTES (Oct. 8, 1989),
http://www.booknotes.org/Watch/9435-1/Barbara-Ehrenreich.aspx [https://perma.cc/QX5M-CUYW].
87 EHRENREICH, WILD GOD, supra note 82, at 115–16.
88 Id. at 119.
89 Id. at 115–16.
90 Id. at 116.
91 Id. at 122–24. For the words she found for the experience, see id. at 116.
92 This does not appear to have happened, from a survey of prominent reviews, but one finds
amidst them hints of what Ehrenreich might reasonably have feared. See, e.g., Dwight Garner,
Believe It or Not, a Skeptic’s Journey, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 15, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1eGV0Wf
[https://perma.cc/L78N-QR4H] (asserting that “this book contains some of her loopiest writing”).
93 See Jeremy Bentham, Paederasty (1785), in Offences Against One’s Self: Paederasty, Part 1, 3
J. HOMOSEXUALITY 389, 389 (Louis Crompton ed., 1978), and Jeremy Bentham’s Essay on
“Paederasty,” Part 2, 4 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 91, 93 (Louis Crompton ed., 1978). Note that Bentham defines “paederasty” here as simply an “impropriety” involving sex with “an object of the
proper species but the wrong sex.” Bentham, Paederasty, Part I, supra, at 389.
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subject — declining even to include them among the papers to be published on his death — knowing how discrediting they would be not only
to him personally but also to the other causes on which he wrote.94
Despite keeping these views private, Bentham did not destroy the manuscripts on the subject, trusting the value of his own ideas and preserving
them for a future generation. And those writings did in fact find a receptive, even enthusiastic audience, centuries later.95
This is of course sometimes why those who write do so. Those whom
writers trust to listen and connect with their perceptions may be at some
distance across time and space — a distance the written word can
travel.96 The prospect of words traveling, the possibility that they will
last, is also one reason why writing can be hard. A form of self-trust
may be useful here too. In her paean to “shitty first drafts,” Anne
Lamott explains why she writes them: “For me and most of the other
writers I know, writing is not rapturous. In fact, the only way I can get
anything written at all is to write really, really shitty first drafts.”97 By
“writing without reining myself in . . . almost just typing, just making
my fingers move,” she says, on a given day the writing itself can get her
past doubt — “because by then I had been writing for so long, I would
eventually let myself trust the process.”98 Trusting the process is, for
Lamott, an avenue to self-trust.99
In the epigraph, Emerson warns that expectations of consistency can
undermine self-trust.100 Because others expect sameness, the tendency
is to tell an identical story again and again — to stick, as they say, to the
script. Emerson’s observation is supported by recent work suggesting
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
94

Bentham wrote of himself, in a précis of a project he imagined writing on the subject someday:
[S]o it has happened, it has falled in his way to have been already, in a certain degree,
useful to mankind: he is in a way to be still more so: and, in case of his being known to be
the author of such a work, there is no saying to what a degree Every prospect of his future
usefulness might, in his instance, be destroyed.
Elizabeth Francis Emens, William Beckford: Sexuality and Reputation 32 (2000) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (quoting University College London Bentham papers, Box 161a, fol. 14iii).
95 The third and fourth volumes of the Journal of Homosexuality published some of these writings by Bentham in 1978. See Bentham, supra note 93.
96 For example, about the poem “To Pi Ssu Yao” by Tu Fu, Czeslaw Milosz writes, “Reading
this poem I reflect upon the obstinacy of artists. Whence comes our passion, our zeal, in working
at the risk of possible loss? Is this only ambition, or a bond with people who might come after us,
some kind of love?” A BOOK OF LUMINOUS THINGS 181 (Czeslaw Milosz ed., 1998). Milosz was
reflecting, presumably, on these lines from Tu Fu: “Our poems will be handed / Down along with
great dead poets’. / We can console each other. / At least we shall have descendants.” Tu Fu, To Pi
Ssu Yao, in KENNETH REXROTH, ONE HUNDRED POEMS FROM THE CHINESE 15 (1971).
97 ANNE LAMOTT, BIRD BY BIRD: SOME INSTRUCTIONS ON WRITING AND LIFE 22 (1994).
98 Id. at 24–25.
99 Id. at 112 (“You need to trust yourself, especially on a first draft . . . .”).
100 See supra p. 1981.
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that “predictability enhances trust.”101 What builds trust, as a psychological matter, may therefore discourage candor. Emerson urges readers
instead to speak their truth, though it changes with time.
We are living in a moment when the question of whom and what to
trust — what sources, both public and private — is especially fraught.
I recently tried an online experiment involving a game to accomplish
what the authors of the study call “pre-bunking.”102 The game teaches
users how to create “fake news” and rile up energy and support among
followers.103 The authors report that, after playing the game, people are
better able to detect fake news.104 In a sense, the game teaches distrust;
in another sense, perhaps, it teaches users how to trust themselves over
the hype.
Of course, self-trust can also lead a person astray. Hasday observes
that self-deception is probably the most common form of deception
(p. 9). As one example, people rarely believe themselves to harbor racial
bias; instead, they trust their own biases.105 This brings us to the subject
of identity’s role in trust and distrust.
C. Who Gets to Trust and Be Trusted, or,
The Role of Power and Identity
[W]hen we came to the United States, my mother said . . . you cannot
trust white people. . . . [E]very time you drive your car, you’re trusting
everybody around you.
— Claudia Rankine106
Growing up as a privileged white child, I was raised not to trust and
also to trust, in a combination I found confusing. I grew up in a home
with an alarm system, but when we vacationed in the woods during the
summer we regularly left cabin doors unlocked, even at night. I then
perplexed my family, at a certain age, by wanting to lock the doors in
summer. Too many horror movies involving cabins in the woods had
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
101 Roy J. Lewicki & Barbara Benedict Bunker, Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS 121 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996).
102 Fake News “Vaccine” Works: “Pre-Bunking” Game Reduces Susceptibility to Disinformation,
EUREKALERT (June 24, 2019), https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2019-06/uoc-fn062119.php
[https://perma.cc/8SYU-JZMF].
103 Id.
104 Jon Roozenbeek & Sander van der Linden, Fake News Game Confers Psychological Resistance Against Online Misinformation, 5 PALGRAVE COMM. 1, 7 (2019).
105 Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting Implicit Group
Attitudes and Beliefs From a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 111–12 (2002)
(reporting on the gap between implicit bias and reported levels of explicit bias).
106 Claudia Rankine: How Can I Say This So We Can Stay in This Car Together?, ON BEING
WITH KRISTA TIPPETT (Jan. 10, 2019), https://onbeing.org/programs/claudia-rankine-how-can-isay-this-so-we-can-stay-in-this-car-together-jan2019 [https://perma.cc/R2C5-U9N2].
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planted images in my dreamscape. Why, I wondered, wouldn’t you just
lock them?
In recent years, I have begun to see the appeal of unlocked doors
even if I still lean on locks. Open doors are inviting. As Carl Sandburg
writes, “An open door says, ‘Come in.’ / A shut door says, ‘Who are
you?’”107 Perhaps even more, presuming that those who enter pose no
threat, and can be trusted, may be comforting — as is the belief that no
one unwanted would ever try to enter. There is a leap of faith that can
feel good to take, when you don’t lock your doors, when you don’t take
precautions. If you can do it.
Yet some of us are denied the privilege of trust.
Professor Patricia Williams famously recounted a racialized experience of trust and distrust in apartment hunting. While co-teaching
Contracts, she and a white male colleague, Professor Peter Gabel, each
went looking for a sublet, which “inevitably” turned into “a discussion
of trust and distrust as factors in bargain relations.”108 Williams was
surprised by Gabel’s trust of strangers:
It turned out that Peter had handed over a $900 deposit in cash, with no
lease, no exchange of keys, and no receipt, to strangers with whom he had
no ties other than a few moments of pleasant conversation. He said he
didn’t need to sign a lease because it imposed too much formality. The
handshake and the good vibes were for him indicators of trust more binding
than a form contract. At the time I told Peter he was mad, but his faith
paid off. His sublessors showed up at the appointed time, keys in hand, to
welcome him in.109

Williams, by contrast, in a “rush to show good faith and trustworthiness”
to the “friends who found [her] an apartment in a building they owned,”
had “signed a detailed, lengthily negotiated, finely printed lease firmly
establishing [her] as the ideal arm’s-length transactor.”110
For Williams, the formalities were not superficial or precautionary.
They were the foundation of trust:
I was raised to be acutely conscious of the likelihood that no matter what
degree of professional I am, people will greet and dismiss my black femaleness as unreliable, untrustworthy, hostile, angry, powerless, irrational, and
probably destitute. Futility and despair are very real parts of my response.
So it helps me to clarify boundary; to show that I can speak the language
of lease is my way of enhancing trust of me in my business affairs.111

That boundary seems to solidify Williams, to ground her, in support of
her own as well as the other’s trust.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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108
109
110
111

CARL SANDBURG, Doors, in THE COMPLETE POEMS OF CARL SANDBURG 654 (1970).
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 146 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id. (citation omitted).
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Williams observed that she and Gabel were seeking similar outcomes
with opposite approaches:
We both wanted to establish enduring relationships with the people in
whose houses we would be living; we both wanted to enhance trust of ourselves and to allow whatever closeness was possible. This similarity of desire, however, could not reconcile our very different relations to the tonalities
of law.112

A history of racialized interactions meant that for Gabel a lack of formalities signaled trust — layers of extralegal constraints were on his
side113 — whereas for Williams the legal formalities seemed the best
chance of overcoming distrust. Formalities seemed a pathway to being
trusted, as well as to building mutual trust.
Legal formalities may be better than a handshake for those lacking
the social privilege of informal enforcement, as Williams observes, but
those formalities nonetheless offer scant protection in many contexts,
leading to well-documented community-wide distrust. Consider, for
example, blue-on-black police encounters.114 In discussions of police
violence and killings of people of color, scholars may reach for some
scaffolding. Warnings, someone will propose, are an answer — perhaps
warnings will enable communication during police encounters, dialogue
about threat and consequences.115 Perhaps warnings will prevent so
many senseless deaths. Others contend that warnings offer no such scaffolding.116 And yet textured ethnographic work suggests that “situational trust” in police may exist,117 even in communities whose relation

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Id.
Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 685 (1986) (“In rural Shasta County, California, residents . . . typically look to informal norms to determine their entitlements in animal trespass situations.”); Rose,
supra note 70, at 537–41 (describing the view that trust may be supported by a lack of formalities
or monitoring).
114 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help
the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 238 & n.28 (2008); Tom
R. Tyler, Policing in Black and White: Ethnic Group Differences in Trust and Confidence in the
Police, 8 POLICE Q. 322, 332–33 (2005); see also Sandra Susan Smith, Race and Trust, 36 ANN.
REV. SOC. 453, 456, 458 (2010).
115 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Daniel Markovits, Ending Excessive Police Force Starts with New
Rules of Engagement, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2014), http://wapo.st/1xlSkvp [https://perma.cc/UG826URB].
116 See, e.g., Roseanna Sommers & Vanessa K. Bohns, The Voluntariness of Voluntary Consent:
Consent Searches and the Psychology of Compliance, 128 YALE L.J. 1962, 2015 (2019); see also Yale
Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Need It, How We Got It —
And What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 177–78 (2007).
117 Monica C. Bell, Situational Trust: How Disadvantaged Mothers Reconceive Legal Cynicism,
50 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 314, 316 (2016).
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to the law is characterized as “legal estrangement,”118 and that reforms
may be built upon this.119
Claudia Rankine, author of the prose-poem Citizen,120 which gave
narrative voice to racial microaggressions (and macroaggressions), recounts her mother telling her, after their family moved to the United
States from Jamaica, “you cannot trust white people.”121 Rankine observes, however, that we all need trust to go about our daily lives:
“[E]very time you drive your car, you’re trusting everybody around
you.”122 She therefore keeps searching for some words to help us begin
to communicate. “I spend a lot of time thinking about, how can I say
this so that we can stay in this car together, and yet explore the things
that I want to explore with you?”123
***
The disparate access and racialized impediments to trust remain a
pressing and unresolved problem in the middle of this discussion of trust
and the law. The subject also points toward a lacuna in the frequent
public rhetoric about increasing trust: scholars and politicians of many
stripes have sought ways to build trust in the police in predominantly
African American neighborhoods.124 But as Professor Onora O’Neill
sagely reminds us, “Trust is valuable only when directed to [objects] that
are trustworthy.”125 How much good — or rather, how much bad — is
done by persuading people to trust an authority that does not warrant
their trust? Institutions must become trustworthy before people are
asked to trust them.126
In the intimate realm, Hasday tells us that courts are no longer sympathetic to racial disappointment in intimacy as grounds for a lawsuit
(pp. 121–24).127 And Hasday, in proposing that courts become generally
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
118 Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J.
2054, 2066 (2017).
119 Id. at 2126–49.
120 CLAUDIA RANKINE, CITIZEN: AN AMERICAN LYRIC (2014).
121 Claudia Rankine: How Can I Say This So We Can Stay in This Car Together?, supra note 106.
122 Id. (emphasis added).
123 Id.
124 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 118, at 2058–59 (discussing this literature, with special reference to
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 9–11 (2015)).
125 Onora O’Neill, Linking Trust to Trustworthiness, 26 INT’L J. PHIL. STUD. 293, 293 (2018);
see also Russell Hardin, The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust, 21 POL. & SOC’Y 505, 512 (1993).
126 Cf., e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation,
81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 367–68 (2001) (“The key to creating trust is to act in ways that community
residents will experience to be fair. . . . If authorities use fair procedures, their motives are judged
to be more trustworthy.”).
127 Cf. Camille Gear Rich, Contracting Our Way to Inequality: Race, Reproductive Freedom and
the Quest for the Perfect Child, 104 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 6–7, 57).
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more sympathetic to claims of intimate deception, is not urging a revival
of these suits. Getting courts out of the business of bolstering civil suits
grounded in racial subordination is progress. But pulling the law that
supports discrimination out of these areas is likely to have limited impact in actually supporting interracial intimacy, given the multiple ways
that our relationships are shaped by legal architecture, as discussed earlier. The legal architecture of intimacy factors into interracial trust both
within and beyond intimate relationships.128
D. Who Must Build Trust and Manage Distrust
We believe, when we let ourselves, that there are things we can trust,
people we can care for, words we can say in earnest.
— Jedediah Purdy129
The previous section has pointed to the difficulty of trusting and
being trusted — and the differences among people, across identity and
social role, in both. With that recognition as backdrop, the epigraph
from Professor Jedediah Purdy turns us toward the possibilities for trust,
the human longing for it. And this section briefly considers the special
role of lawyers in acting as agents for important forms of trust as well
as distrust.
Lawyers are required to distrust the facts as given — or at least not
merely trust them. When a death penalty lawyer listens to her client,
for example, she cannot accept everything said at face value. Under
ABA guidelines, effective and vigorous representation requires the
lawyer to listen and investigate thoroughly,130 which may mean interviewing certain witnesses despite a client’s request to the contrary.131
Transactional lawyers must also anticipate the worst. They take the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
128
129

See Emens, supra note 51, at 1393–96 (discussing the “architecture of intimacy”).
JEDEDIAH PURDY, FOR COMMON THINGS, at xv (1999). Purdy is writing in a different
context, and the preceding lines are these: “I do not believe that, even when it is strongest, irony
has convinced us that nothing is real, true, or ours.” Id.
130 AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES guideline 10.7 (2003) [hereinafter ABA
GUIDELINES], reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 1015 (2003); see also AM. BAR ASS’N,
SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES FOR THE MITIGATION FUNCTION OF DEFENSE TEAMS IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES, reprinted in 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 689 (2008).
131 ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 130, guideline 10.7, at 1015 (“The investigation regarding penalty should be conducted regardless of any statement by the client that evidence bearing upon penalty is not to be collected or presented.”); id. commentary to guideline 10.7, at 1021 (“Counsel cannot
responsibly advise a client about the merits of different courses of action, the client cannot make
informed decisions, and counsel cannot be sure of the client’s competency to make such decisions,
unless counsel has first conducted a thorough investigation with respect to both phases of the case.”
(citation omitted)). As noted there, “in capital cases, the mental vulnerabilities of a large portion of
the client population compound the possibilities for error.” Id. commentary to guideline 10.7, at
1017. I thank Alexis Hoag for this point.
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deal struck by the principals, think up what could go wrong, and create
language to address those possibilities.
More generally, the livelihood of many lawyers might be said to depend on distrust. This likely contributes to the stereotypes and negative
attitudes toward lawyers. In the words of one non-lawyer, a world of
perfect trust might well mean “the elimination of mountains of paperwork and half the legal profession.”132
Alongside these expectations of distrust, lawyers are also required to
build trust. They must build relationships with clients, facilitate negotiations with hostile parties, persuade judges to believe their arguments,
work in teams to achieve common goals in litigation, corporate law, and
other domains — to name a few examples of ways lawyers need trust.133
Professor Susan Sturm has persuasively diagnosed the tension between
these two demands on lawyers — to investigate skeptically and to build
trust — as a lawyering paradox.134
Lawyers may at times have the capacity to act as agents of both trust
and distrust on behalf of their clients.135 They may be able to build
affective bridges across conflict, where the client’s history and emotions
preclude even the trust necessary to sit in the same room with an adversary. And a lawyer may also be able to prevent emotions from hindering
the ability to inquire, to ask, to investigate, to look for the facts behind
the drama (positive or negative).
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
132 SHIMON APISDORF, ROSH HASHANAH YOM KIPPUR SURVIVAL KIT 73 (1992) (“Imagine
a world where contracts didn’t have to be signed. Where a person’s word was ‘as good as gold’
and a handshake was a done deal. Imagine if people actually lived with that kind of trust in one
another. Imagine the integrity. Beyond the elimination of mountains of paperwork and half the
legal profession, it would be a different world.”); see also Rose, supra note 70, at 531 (“Lawyers do
not have much of a reputation for fostering trust. We insist that ordinary people get everything
down on paper, thereby sowing seeds of discord and suspicion . . . .”).
133 See, e.g., Jay Quam, Adversarial Advocacy: Too Much Adversity Can Hurt You, BENCH & B.
MINN., Apr. 2011, at 22, 24; Dana A. Remus, Reconstructing Professionalism, 51 GA. L. REV. 807,
848–51 (2017); Gretchen Viney, Using the Fee Agreement to Build Client Rapport, WIS. LAW., Nov.
2013, at 11, 13; Paul R. Williams & Christin Coaster, #Lawyeringpeace: The Role of Lawyers in
Peacebuilding, 22 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 493, 497 (2016). Lawyers may also conceive of building trust as not merely instrumental but as central to the relational aspect of zealous advocacy. See
generally Remus, supra, at 849–50. I thank Colleen Shanahan for this point.
134 Susan P. Sturm, Lawyering Paradoxes: Making Meaning of the Contradictions 20–34 (Columbia
Pub. Law Research Paper No. 14–6432, 2019), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_
scholarship/2579 [https://perma.cc/5SXH-E3SQ].
135 See, e.g., Susan Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, Reflecting on the Habits: Teaching About Identity,
Culture, Language, and Difference, in TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS 349, 365
(Susan Bryant, Elliott S. Milstein & Ann C. Shalleck eds., 2014) (describing the interplay between
the “methodological doubt” and “methodological belief” lawyers need to practice); cf., e.g., Jennifer
Arlen & Stephan Tontrup, Does the Endowment Effect Justify Legal Intervention? The Debiasing
Effect of Institutions, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 175–76 (2015) (suggesting that shifting responsibility
to agents — such as lawyers — can help individuals engage in transactions that their emotions may
otherwise prevent them from engaging in).
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Think again of John Dahl and his sister Dorothy Zauhar who
brought suit against the man who accepted Dahl’s kidney donation,
while engaged to Zauhar, then promptly cancelled the wedding. Brother
and sister were both alleging a painful betrayal — emotionally for each,
in different ways, and physically for Dahl.136 The need to build trust as
well as gather facts would be — or should be — apparent to a lawyer
meeting with these plaintiffs. As Hasday reports, individuals whose
intimates have lied to them in consequential ways often report the challenge of trusting again (p. 91).137 “Many people have stressed how devastating losing trust in a deceitful intimate can be,” she writes (p. 90).
In one victim’s words, a betrayal can be “trust-shattering” (p. 90).138
E. Mythic Trust, or, “Trust . . . Then Jump”
Do you trust me? . . . Then jump!
— Aladdin139
How did the plaintiffs in Dahl v. McNutt,140 Dorothy Zauhar and
her brother, end up in this predicament? The affections of Zauhar’s
fiancé, Harvard-educated businessman Richard McNutt, had fluctuated
over time, as discussed earlier.141 Once a kidney donation from her
brother looked promising, they set a date for the wedding.142 Consider
Zauhar’s position. Could she have said to McNutt at this point, Yes!
I’ll marry you!, while also allowing herself to think, Is it possible you’re
proposing to marry me just because you want a kidney from me or my
brother?
Several psychological heuristics — mental shortcuts — could inhibit
Zauhar’s ability to detect McNutt’s apparent deceit. The truth default,
mentioned earlier, means people tend to assume others are telling the
truth (pp. 53–54).143 Confirmation bias, Hasday notes, leads people to
assimilate new information to existing narratives or beliefs (p. 53). In
addition, because of optimism bias, people tend to expect that good
things rather than bad will happen to them.144 (What happens to the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Again, these facts follow the plaintiffs’ version. See supra note 9.
Hasday recounts one man’s description of “the cruel dilemma confronting deceived intimates
after the truth emerges: ‘On the one hand, we’ve learned some very difficult but valuable lessons
about trusting others. But, the negative side is that too much distrust can prevent us from ever
developing a loving relationship again’” (p. 91).
138 The author quotes BONNIE EAKER WEIL, FINANCIAL INFIDELITY 148 (2008).
139 ALADDIN: THE COMPLETE SCRIPT (compiled by Ben Scripps), http://www.fpx.de/fp/
Disney/Scripts/Aladdin.txt [https://perma.cc/9WM9-9ZU2].
140 No. C3-97-601906, slip op. (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 1998).
141 See supra p. 1976.
142 Complaint at 5, Dahl, No. C3-97-601906 (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
143 See note 38 and accompanying text.
144 See, e.g., TALI SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS, at xi–xvi (2011). Hasday doesn’t discuss
optimism bias, but does note that existing research “suggest[s] that people are more likely to believe
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plaintiffs in this case, if their account is to be believed, would be quite
a bad thing to imagine was happening.)
In addition to these and other heuristics, trusting in a romantic context is shrouded in a kind of narrative mythology, vividly rendered in
the classic Disney movie Aladdin,145 quoted in the epigraph. Early in
the movie, a near stranger holds out his hand to Princess Jasmine and
asks, “Do you trust me?”146 She hesitates at first, saying, “What?”147
The stranger, Aladdin, repeats the question, “Do you trust me?”148
“Yes,” she says, taking his hand, as they stand at a precipice.149 “Then
jump!” he calls out, as they jump down many stories to (what turns out
to be) a safe landing.150 Aladdin’s invitation to trust him is repeated
again later.151 Each time, she trusts.152 Each time, that moment of trust
builds their romance.153
What if Princess Jasmine had responded, Let me talk to my lawyer
first? Or, Let me hire a private investigator to check out if you’re really
who you say you are. Investigating your intimates and prospective intimates, Hasday points out, is terrifically hard, as a practical matter (pp.
59–64). It is also normatively discouraged by cultural understandings
of romance and love,154 as Aladdin showcases, reflecting a mythology of
love and “blind trust”155 as intertwined. Trust-then-jump represents
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
deception that flatters them, deception that is designed to ingratiate, and/or deception that they
want to believe is true” (p. 54 (citation omitted)).
145 ALADDIN (Walt Disney Pictures 1992).
146 ALADDIN: THE COMPLETE SCRIPT, supra note 139.
147 Id.
148 Id. (emphasis added).
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 The film arguably warrants a close reading beyond the scope of this Review, but a few notes
follow: Aladdin also deceives Jasmine, pretending to be a prince to get past a rule that says the
princess must marry a prince. (At first we might say he actually becomes a prince, through the
magic of the genie which is real within their fictional world, but when she begins to ask him questions about his identity, he then builds up lies about himself to support the genie’s magic.) When
she finds out about his fabrication, she is angry. But then he saves her again, and they convince
the sultan to change the law so that, ultimately, they can in fact marry. Moreover, Jasmine deceives
Aladdin, as well, from the first moment they meet, when she is disguised as a commoner. So deception and moving past it is a dance they both lead, though he for much longer.
154 Questioning others’ truthfulness is also disliked and discouraged by social norms more generally. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 70, at 540.
155 I put “blind trust” in quotation marks to mark it as a phrase with a history and to signify
concern with its use of blindness as a metaphor. Disability metaphors typically draw on a long
history of negative stereotypes and ignorant assumptions about what the actual disabilities entail.
For further discussions, see generally JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 30–40 (1993); Elizabeth F. Emens,
What’s Left in Her Wake: In Honor of Adrienne Asch, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.–Apr. 2014, at
19, 20; Rachel Cohen-Rottenberg, Doing Social Justice: 10 Reasons to Give up Ableist Language,
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love as “a leap of faith.”156 The anti-rational quality of this leap is accentuated in the Broadway version of Aladdin, where Princess Jasmine
inserts one further phrase in her response to Aladdin’s invitation to
trust: “I’m not sure why,” she observes, “but . . . yes.”157
***
Though hard numbers are elusive, existing data suggest that relatively few people sign prenuptial agreements.158 This is unsurprising.
Prenups address what happens if the marriage fails, and those on the
brink of marriage don’t want to plan for failure. But declining to recognize that marriage exists “under the shadow of divorce” means taking
a significant risk.159
The eyes-wide-shut approach to big decisions may be a recipe for the
kinds of disappointment Hasday’s book catalogues.160 And yet a feeling
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
HUFFPOST (June 10, 2014, 6:58 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/doing-social-justicethou_b_5476271 [https://perma.cc/JN3H-6NCX].
156 The phrase “leap of faith” — commonly (and perhaps erroneously) thought to be coined by
Søren Kierkegaard writing in a very different context, see Richard Schacht, Kierkegaard on “Truth
is Subjectivity” and “The Leap of Faith,” 2 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 297, 306 (1973) — has arguably
become a cliché about romantic love. See, e.g., Maureen Lee Lenker, All the Rom-Com Clichés We
Love in Netflix’s Falling Inn Love, ENT. WKLY. (Aug. 30, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://ew.com/
movies/2019/08/30/rom-com-cliches-falling-inn-love [https://perma.cc/T5VE-NAFR] (“Romance is
often about taking a leap of faith — for another person or possibly yourself.”).
157 A Whole New World Lyrics — Aladdin, ALL MUSICALS, https://www.allmusicals.com/
lyrics/aladdin/awholenewworld.htm [https://perma.cc/RB3M-L6W9].
158 This is stated tentatively because definitive data on this point are lacking. Some sources say very
few people sign prenups, citing a figure of five percent, but without a verifiable empirical source. See,
e.g., Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 887, 891 (1997); see also Gary Belsky, Living by the Rules, MONEY (May 1996),
https://money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/moneymag_archive/1996/05/01/212090/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/C573-EPC9] (stating that approximately 50,000 prenuptial agreements are signed each
year). Other sources say that prenups are increasing in some populations, for instance among millennials,
or among those entering second marriages; one professional organization reports that sixty-two percent
of matrimonial lawyers surveyed in 2016 reported an increase in prenups, but without attempting to
estimate a base rate in the population. Prenuptial Agreements on the Rise Finds Survey, CISION PR
NEWSWIRE (Oct. 28, 2016, 10:32 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/prenuptialagreements-on-the-rise-finds-survey-300353444.html [https://perma.cc/PA99-QY62]; see also Susan
Shain, The Rise of the Millennial Prenup, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2IYhSWo
[https://perma.cc/B2TF-SMRA]; Geoff Williams, The Pros and Cons of Prenups, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/family-finance/articles/2018-0803/the-pros-and-cons-of-prenups [https://perma.cc/5QCL-2L73].
159 Jeannie Suk Gersen, What “Divorce” Understands About Marriage, NEW YORKER (Oct. 16,
2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-divorce-understands-about-marriage
[https://perma.cc/JF6K-Q8BJ].
160 Note that this mythic norm of “trust then jump” entails complex gender dynamics, which
warrant more involved discussion than this Review allows. It is worth noting, though, that the
norm is not necessarily symmetrical along the directional dimension of trust. Norms for women
seem to involve more expectations of unquestioning trust, whereas a certain archetypal vision of
male love involves jealousy that may entail suspicion rather than trust. See, e.g., Victoria E. Collins
& Dianne C. Carmody, Deadly Love: Images of Dating Violence in the “Twilight Saga,” 26 AFFILIA
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of trust seems vital to forward motion on such occasions. The next Part
suggests a framework for navigating this tension.
III. TRUSTING WITH EYES WIDE OPEN
O, love’s best habit is in seeming trust
— William Shakespeare161
In this Part, I offer a pathway through the competing values of trust
and distrust, drawing strengths from each to propose a combination of
affective trust and cognitive distrust or curiosity. I then apply this
framework to Intimate Lies and the Law, using it to evaluate Hasday’s
proposals for reform and present a further refinement of the central normative argument. Next, I apply the framework to a recent legal development relevant to intimate relationships: the New Mexico Supreme
Court’s decision to abolish the marital confidences privilege. Lastly, I
apply the framework of trust and curiosity to devise a new approach to
prenuptial agreements.
A. Mapping Trust
I have no special talents, I am only passionately curious.
— Albert Einstein (for real this time)162
Trusting too much, too freely, is dangerous. Unpacking that problematic phrase “blind trust” helps us understand the danger. The phrase
implies trust that is ignorant. A person engaging in blind trust is closing
her eyes to reality, declining to see the facts before her. Blind trust is
stupid trust. (This example nicely shows the problem with common
disability metaphors; they often reflect or contribute to erroneous stereotypes, like the idea that blind people are stupid.163) The central point
here, though, is this: intelligent living requires distrust.
And yet failing to trust is arguably more dangerous. Ours is a social
world. No man is an island.164 The basics of life in modern society
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
382, 388 (2011) (finding twenty-nine of thirty-one instances of jealousy in the Twilight book series
to be jealousy by male characters directed at the female protagonist). More egalitarian visions of
romantic love seem instead to emphasize trust on both sides, however.
161 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Sonnet 138, in THE YALE SHAKESPEARE: SHAKESPEARE’S
SONNETS 69 (Edward Bliss Reed ed., 1923).
162 “Ich habe keine besondere Begabung, sondern bin nur leidenschaftlich neugierig.” Letter from
Albert Einstein to Carl Seelig (Mar. 11, 1952), http://www.library.ethz.ch/en/Ressourcen/
Digitale-Bibliothek/Einstein-Online/Princeton-1933-1955 [https://perma.cc/4PTP-57WW].
With
thanks to Nam Jin Yoon for locating the letter and Professor Adam Tooze for confirming the translation.
163 See supra note 155.
164 JOHN DONNE, Meditation XVII, in DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS, AND
SEVERAL STEPS IN MY SICKNES 193, 195 (D.A. Talboys ed., Oxford 1841) (1624); see Annette
Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231, 235–36, 241 (1986).
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require coordination on both a small and large scale.165 And this is
especially true in intimate relationships, which generally involve a degree of caregiving and interdependency. In our lives, major and minor
outcomes depend on relationships, which depend on trust.166
We thus need some measure of both trust and distrust. Professor
Edna Ullmann-Margalit has observed that trust and distrust are not
precise opposites.167 They need not necessarily be so. What we need, I
would venture, are asymmetrical aspects of each.
We would do well to combine affective trust with cognitive distrust.
Although the distinction commonly drawn between feeling (affective)
and thinking (cognitive) is inadequate if not entirely artificial,168 these
categories provide a useful heuristic to organize and describe experience,
as this section will show.
Affective trust is emotional trust. This is the feeling state of connection, of safety.169 Affective trust for another person is feeling safe in
their presence, in their concern for you. If the trust is mutual, then the
other person also feels safe with you. You can trust a physical space (as
in, I feel safe here). And affective trust need have no direct object at all.
A person can simply feel trusting (as in, I feel the universe is a friendly
place). A general state of affective trust might well be understood as the
opposite of anxiety. And an “act of trust” may be an act rooted — in
reality or aspirationally — in the feeling of safety with another, an emotional security that the person will protect rather than exploit or harm
you in your vulnerability.
Cognitive distrust, by contrast, is mental inquiry. This is an active
state of inquiring into the facts, to find the truth. Cognitive distrust means
declining to take things for granted — not accepting the superficial
presentation of reality. This means embracing what is true over what you
want to believe.170 The poet Galway Kinnell writes, “Whatever / what is
is is what / I want. Only that. But that.”171 Cognitive distrust involves
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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166
167

See, e.g., Rose, supra note 70, at 531–32.
See, e.g., Hardin, supra note 125, at 507.
Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Trust, Distrust, and In Between, in DISTRUST 60, 61–62 (Russell
Hardin ed., 2004).
168 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF
EMOTIONS 34 (2001) (“[T]he cognitive elements are an essential part of the emotion’s identity, and
of what differentiates one emotion from other emotions.”); see also id. at 19-294 (setting out a “cognitive-evaluative” view of emotions); cf., e.g., George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127
PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 270–71 (2001) (“[F]eelings about risk and cognitive risk perceptions often
diverge, sometimes strikingly.” Id. at 271.).
169 Cf., e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF
THE EMOTIONS 47–53 (1988).
170 This is not to say that what is true is necessarily found through the cognitive. Indeed, a
certain kind of thinking can get in the way of other kinds of knowledge, for instance, somatic
knowledge. See, e.g., LAMOTT, supra note 97, at 110–15.
171 GALWAY KINNELL, Prayer, in COLLECTED POEMS 343, 343 (2017).
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facing reality, not hiding from it. And if the truth is not apparent once you
open your eyes to it, then cognitive distrust also means a readiness to dig
to the bottom of things, to find what’s really there.
The two in combination overlap with what Professor Carol Rose describes as semi-rational trust — “a trust that asks for assurances and
monitoring.”172 But disaggregating the emotional feeling of trust from
the cognitive thinking of trust (or distrust) enables a departure from the
hierarchy of real and unreal trust that Rose sets up. For Rose, characterizing the common view, “‘real’ or ‘true’ trust is a kind of confidence
that does not even ask for good grounds” and so “there is no such thing
as rational trust.”173 Her semi-rational trust — which is “a doubting or
suspicious trust” — “is something less than this ‘real’ trust.”174 By contrast, I want to propose that emotional trust and cognitive trust exist on
equal footing and can be present or absent in various combinations.
The stories in Intimate Lies and the Law suggest the importance of
the combination of affective trust and cognitive distrust. With this pairing, people can do the cognitive inquiring into the bad things that could
happen and how to address them — while emotionally not going
through the anxious suffering of feeling unmoored. Stepping up to inquire need not require abandoning a feeling of safety.
To represent a client or conduct a negotiation, a lawyer needs to anticipate what might go wrong and to guard against it. Yet a lawyer who
approaches these tasks with affective distrust may reduce the prospect
for collaboration through emotional contagion,175 among other burdens.
Thus, affective trust combined with the cognitive distrust could be a
path forward in negotiations — and in getting to sleep at night. Here,
one can do the right amount of due diligence as a cognitive matter —
which (sometimes) requires anticipating bad things that might happen,
thinking about what should be done to guard against them, and doing
the right amount of those things — but without the affective worry.
One difficult question is whether it’s possible to hold these two positions — affective trust and cognitive distrust — at the same time.
Keats tells us that “Negative Capability” — which has often been interpreted to mean the ability to hold two conflicting ideas in productive
tension176 — is characteristic of the “Man of Achievement,”177 but what
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
172
173
174
175

Rose, supra note 70, at 535.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 535 (third emphasis added).
Cf., e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs,
and the ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399, 430–35 (2006) (explaining emotional contagion and citing sources).
176 Nathan Comfort Starr, Negative Capability in Keats’s Diction, 15 KEATS-SHELLEY J. 59, 59
(1996).
177 In Keats’s original description, negative capability is a bit different: “Negative Capability, that
is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching
after fact and reason.” Letter from John Keats to George & Thomas Keats (Dec. 22, 1817), in THE
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about the rest of us? Some encouragement may be found in the content
dimension of trust discussed earlier: if we don’t trust everyone for all
things, then even in the closest of relationships, there are some areas
already characterized by a lack of trust. For instance, a poet might trust
her husband to cook dinner but not to edit her work.
Even if we can begin to find avenues to support the prospect of a
dynamic tension between affective trust and cognitive distrust, the mere
word distrust seems to cut against the feeling of trust. An alternative
and better frame for cognitive distrust, then, may be curiosity.
Curiosity might be understood as a warm version of cognitive distrust. Empirical and philosophical writings on curiosity identify multiple subspecies. William James, among others, has divided the world of
curiosity into “two instinctive types.”178 The first is a kind of sensoryseeking excitability.179 The second is the important one here: “scientific
(i.e., cognitive) curiosity”180 — or what James described as “the impulse
toward completer knowledge.”181 In this type of curiosity, “the actual
ways humans conceive of objects act as stimuli and sensitize them to
knowledge gaps, which, when resolved, result in feelings of pleasure and
facilitate the storage of scientific knowledge.”182 In James’s words, “The
philosophic brain responds to an inconsistency or a gap in its knowledge,
just as the musical brain responds to a discord in what it hears.”183
Similarly, John Dewey described intellectual curiosity as the “interest in
problems provoked by the observation of things and the accumulation
of material.”184 Empirical investigation confirms that curiosity does appear to comprise several subspecies,185 including cognitive curiosity or
what Professor Daniel Berlyne called, in his classic article on the subject,

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF KEATS 277 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co. 1899). The pervasiveness of the interpretation I give in the body text signals the perceived elusiveness of the quality
so understood as well.
178 Thomas G. Reio Jr. et al., The Measurement and Conceptualization of Curiosity, 167 J.
GENETIC PSYCHOL. 117, 119 (2006) (citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF
PSYCHOLOGY (Dover Publications 1950) (1890) [hereinafter JAMES, PRINCIPLES]); see also
WILLIAM JAMES, TALKS TO TEACHERS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND TO STUDENTS ON SOME OF
LIFE’S IDEALS 24–25 (Dover Publications 1962) (1899) [hereinafter JAMES, TALKS TO
TEACHERS] (describing the two types in lively terms).
179 See JAMES, TALKS TO TEACHERS, supra note 178, at 24–25; Reio et al., supra note 178, at 119.
180 Reio et al., supra note 178, at 119.
181 JAMES, TALKS TO TEACHERS, supra note 178, at 24.
182 Reio et al., supra note 178, at 119.
183 2 JAMES, PRINCIPLES, supra note 178, at 430.
184 JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK 33 (1910) (emphasis omitted).
185 See, e.g., George Loewenstein, The Psychology of Curiosity: A Review and Reinterpretation,
116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 75, 77–78, 83 (1994); Litman, supra note 14, at 422–24.
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“epistemic curiosity.”186 More recently, epistemic curiosity has been defined as “the motive to seek, obtain and make use of new knowledge.”187
Epistemic curiosity has become the focus of a growing field of social
scientific inquiry — a site of great curiosity, it might be said. And it has
been subdivided into two types: “interest” and “deprivation” curiosity.188
Interest curiosity involves “a desire for new information anticipated to increase pleasurable feelings of situational interest.”189 This type is “associated with an open, positive approach towards learning, implying a
broadly optimistic outlook regarding new discoveries”190 — or, as vividly
rendered by Professor Judson Brewer, “that wide-eyed wonder that draws
us to explore.”191 Deprivation curiosity, by contrast, involves “striving to
fill bothersome knowledge-gaps.”192 Such states “are theorized to resemble a ‘need-like’ condition, involving unpleasant feelings of tension and
perplexity, which increase until satisfactorily resolved”193 — in other
words, “that restless need to know itch.”194 Although deprivation curiosity has been described as more “closed,” compared to interest curiosity, the
two forms of epistemic curiosity are correlated,195 and both involve an
active engagement in information seeking.
More generally, the overarching rubric of epistemic curiosity, like
cognitive distrust, suggests an orientation toward learning rather than
assuming. The term curiosity connotes a more positive affect than does
the term distrust, so it seems more apt for pairing with affective trust.
Moreover, the descriptor epistemic admits of more types of knowledge
than does cognitive, so it better captures the forms of knowing people
need to protect themselves.196
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
186 D.E. Berlyne, A Theory of Human Curiosity, 45 BRITISH J. PSYCHOL. 180, 180 (1954). There
is a rising tide of research on curiosity that may, before long, spur evolution in the current typology.
See, e.g., Celeste Kidd & Benjamin Y. Hayden, The Psychology and Neuroscience of Curiosity, 88
NEURON 449, 457 (2015) (“[W]e anticipate that, although useful in the past, Berlyne’s categories
will be replaced with other, differently formulated subtypes and that these newer ones will be motivated by new neural and developmental data.”).
187 Marco Lauriola et al., Epistemic Curiosity and Self-Regulation, 83 PERSONALITY &
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 202, 202 (2015).
188 Id.
189 Id. (emphasis omitted).
190 Id. at 203.
191 Judson Brewer, Curiosity: Our Superpower for Everything from Breaking Bad Habits to
Discovering Life, DR. JUD (Sept. 24, 2019), https://drjud.com/curiosity-superpower [https://
perma.cc/MX2W-D3S5].
192 Lauriola et al., supra note 187, at 202.
193 Id. at 203.
194 Brewer, supra note 191.
195 See, e.g., Litman, supra note 14, at 422–23.
196 Note that, by introducing the terminology of curiosity to include the pursuit of information
that might have some consequences, my usage seems to be in some tension with work that frames
curiosity as wholly intrinsically motivated. See, e.g., Nick Chater & George Loewenstein, The
Under-Appreciated Drive for Sense-Making, 126 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 137, 145 (2016)
(“Curiosity, by definition, refers to intrinsically motivated seeking after information . . . where the
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Returning to the theme of trust and intimate relationships, then, I
want to propose a framework that combines affective trust and epistemic
curiosity. What I think the law should encourage is the ability for individuals to feel safe and build bonds rooted in that feeling of safety, while
also remaining open to and curious about information that could affect
their well-being. Whether legal regimes can directly engender trust or
curiosity is an unanswered empirical question, but current knowledge
about epistemic curiosity can help evaluate which regimes are better
situated at least to enable or support affective trust and epistemic curiosity in intimate relationships.197
Before applying this framework to Hasday’s proposals and other contexts, I want to conclude by noting a geographical and gendered dimension to curiosity. Though we often think of curiosity as a positive quality
or orientation or feeling,198 curiosity has not been encouraged or praised
in equal measures across identities.199 Our celebrated portrayals of curiosity tend to be masculine, “able-bodied and quintessentially mobile” —
bearing markers of “colonial and other unequal power relations.”200 The
image of the European explorer, a lone man seeking out new lands in a
dominating stance, is just one of Western culture’s “problematic symbols
of curiosity and models for curious endeavours.”201 By contrast, icons of
female curiosity include Eve and Pandora202 — a rather stark contrast.203
Only some forms of curiosity are normative; our so-called natural curiosity is celebrated selectively. Though the pages that follow will not delve
into this, a topic that warrants further examination is the differential need
for encouraging curiosity, across identities.
***
The rest of this Part identifies some possible directions for enabling
affective trust and epistemic curiosity through law, beginning with
Hasday’s proposals for reform.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
information we are ‘curious’ about has no implications for our evaluation . . . of our lives.”). In
later parts of the discussion, I also bring in curiosity that is more open-ended, see infra p. 2015, but
I view curiosity as capacious enough to include both.
197 See infra sections III.C, pp. 2007–11, and III.D, pp. 2011–16.
198 Richard Phillips, Space for Curiosity, 38 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 493, 493 (2014) (“In
education and creative industries, ordinary workplaces and everyday life, [curiosity] is portrayed as
a good thing, worthy of encouragement and support.”).
199 See id. at 502–03.
200 Id. at 502.
201 Id.
202 See, e.g., Gila Ofer & Joshua Durban, Curiosity: Reflections on Its Nature and Functions, 53
AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 35, 37–38 (1999) (discussing, inter alia, the Greek myth of Pandora’s box).
203 Cf. Robert F. Blomquist, Law and Curiosity, 81 UMKC L. REV. 837, 839 (2013) (“Too much
curiosity has been viewed by some thinkers as a type of intemperance — a vice from the virtue of
temperance — related to excessive sensuality, cruelty, and an inordinate desire for things of the
world.”).
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B. Hasday’s Proposals
[A] human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for
these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief . . . .
— Samuel Taylor Coleridge204
Hasday’s proposals implicitly reflect the framework of supporting
both affective trust and epistemic curiosity. This section draws out this
feature of the book, through several examples, and then uses the framework to question and refine two aspects of her normative prescription.
1. Proposals Supporting Affective Trust. — Hasday argues for reforms that would protect those duped by their intimates from the harsh
consequences they currently face. Principally, she argues for better
aligning of the law of intimate deception with the law governing nonintimate deception: “Judges are more likely to make wise decisions if
they start with a rebuttable presumption that the law will provide remedies for deception within an intimate relationship when redress would
be available for an equivalent example of deception outside of intimacy”
(p. 200). Thus, under Hasday’s approach,
[P]laintiffs who can establish all the elements of a claim for fraud, misrepresentation, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or the like —
but were deceived by an intimate rather than a stranger . . . [ — will be
presumed able to] pursue their claims without regard to whether they were
intimates of the defendants when deceived. (p. 204)

Hasday’s reasons for supporting this approach include securing compensation to plaintiffs for their injuries and helping to deter intimate
deception in the first place (p. 199).
As Hasday explains, some onlookers are skeptical about the injuries
and reasons that duped intimates may sue.205 But she suggests there
are a meaningful number of legitimate cases of financial as well as emotional harm, in which plaintiffs sue in order to try “to secure at least
partial compensation through money damages . . . notwithstanding the
judiciary’s present hostility to such claims” (p. 201).
Hasday recognizes that the law’s power to deter intimate deception
is limited: “I do not believe that the law could ever completely deter
intimate deception and would never promise that the incidence of intimate deception would decline by a certain amount if courts adopt my
proposed approach” (p. 201). She recognizes “[m]yriad factors [that] constrain the law’s ability to deter,” such as deceivers’ ignorance of the law
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
204 SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, 2 BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA; OR, BIOGRAPHICAL
SKETCHES OF MY LITERARY LIFE AND OPINIONS 2 (2d ed. London, William Pickering 1847)
(“In this idea originated the plan of the Lyrical Ballads; in which it was agreed, that my endeavours
should be directed to persons and characters supernatural, or at least romantic; yet so as to transfer
from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these
shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic
faith.”).
205 See supra pp. 1968–69.
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and a belief that their intimates wouldn’t sue them (p. 201). Nonetheless, Hasday argues, law has a role to play:
[E]ven a few well-publicized damage awards could jolt some people into
worrying about whether deceiving their intimates could trigger legal liability, or simply cause some deceivers to reassess the wisdom and justness of
their actions. Judicial victories for deceived intimates are especially likely
to attract widespread media coverage and popular notice given the cultural
fascination with intimate deception. (p. 201)

Under the “availability heuristic,”206 such media attention to recoveries
by duped intimates might well be remembered. And for those whose
deception “involves sustained planning over time” — of which the kidney case is a striking example — the potential for deterrence seems quite
real (p. 201).
If law can help create compensation for the material consequences
of being duped, that might support particular plaintiffs in their ability
to trust again, something that can be difficult after a dramatic breach.207
More broadly, the prospect of a safety net — a pathway to compensation
for financial and other injuries sustained — makes trusting a safer proposition for everyone (or, rather, for everyone who has the money and
time for civil litigation208). A financial reward may fail to remedy an
emotional injury, but it can quite literally compensate for financial or
other material harm.209
Others of Hasday’s proposals attempt to compensate victims or reduce deception in particular areas, for instance, by adding penalties for
the harms of deception by those who perpetrate sham marriages (p. 229).
Recall the woman who devoted half her work week for years to trying
to bring her Soviet husband to the United States, only to learn after his
successful arrival that he was merely using her to emigrate.210 The effects on her career and her time could have been compensated and, even
if he was judgment proof when he arrived, the U.S. legal system has
evolved mechanisms for restitutionary relief meted out over time that
could have provided her with some measure of fiscal and emotional relief for these injuries. Hasday also notes that “the federal government
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
206 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973) (“A person is said to employ the availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which instances or
associations could be brought to mind.”).
207 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
208 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants from the
Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1536–37 (2016).
209 A concern may of course be raised about crowding out, which merits more discussion, but
should not undercut the overarching point ultimately made here: receiving material compensation for
material harms makes trusting a safer proposition. On crowding out, see, for example, Kristen
Underhill, When Extrinsic Incentives Displace Intrinsic Motivation: Designing Legal Carrots and
Sticks to Confront the Challenge of Motivational Crowding-Out, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 213, 219–24
(2016).
210 See supra notes 3–5, 10 and accompanying text (discussing Gubin v. Lodisev, 494 N.W.2d 782
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992)).
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could reduce the incentives to deceive citizens into sham marriages for
immigration purposes by increasing the opportunities for legal immigration that are open to people who are not closely related to United States
citizens,” but does not hold out for an “overhaul” of the current immigration system (p. 228). She observes the oddity, however, of the current
immigration system’s applying identical penalties to “[s]omeone who entered a sham marriage in cahoots with a willing accomplice” and to
“someone who duped an unwitting citizen into a marriage that the citizen believed was genuine” (p. 228). At the very least, she suggests, the
limited resources for enforcement should be expended on “pursuing
cases where the citizen was duped” (p. 228).
2. Proposals Supporting Epistemic Curiosity. — Hasday not only
proposes mechanisms to protect intimates’ sense of safety or comfortable
gullibility, but also offers proposals that would better allow intimates to
protect themselves. Of particular relevance to the framework I am suggesting, Hasday recommends creating multistate registries of certain
public records, so that people are better able to investigate their
intimates (pp. 231–32).
Hasday diagnoses a quandary surrounding investigating your intimates: on the one hand, courts treat people (often women211) like fools
for falling prey to deceptive partners (p. 123);212 on the other hand, the
law also makes it exceedingly difficult to investigate an intimate partner
(pp. 64–76). This isn’t just an accidental artifact of laws seeking to
protect everyone from the prying eyes of strangers or commercial entities. Instead, Hasday argues, lawmakers passing anti-investigative laws
“repeatedly recognized and appreciated that a substantial proportion of
the investigations they were impeding would involve intimates” (p. 64).
Finding the wherewithal to doubt intimates — to evince cognitive distrust or epistemic curiosity — is hard enough. Rather than supporting
the curious impulse, though, the law makes things even harder for anyone willing to inquire into the truth.
Hasday’s proposed registries aim not to compromise privacy protections but to make public information about relevant intimate matters
more readily available. The law should make it easier for intimates to
learn whether they are being deceived when such facilitation can be
accomplished without jeopardizing privacy, liberty, or security (pp. 231–
32). Given the difficulty of investigating an intimate, Hasday suggests
“consolidat[ing] at least some public records and mak[ing] them more
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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212

On the gender dimensions, see supra Part I, pp. 1966–77.
One example that Hasday describes is a case in which the court “sent [the Indian male plaintiff] off with a version of the admonishment that courts frequently deploy when rejecting an intimate deception claim, advising [him] that he should have conducted a more thorough premarital
‘investigation’ to determine whether marrying [the female defendant] would be consistent with the
caste system’s tenets” (p. 123) (citing Pavel v. Navitlal, 627 A.2d 683, 688 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 1992)).
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accessible,” such as “a centralized registry recording all marriages and
divorces in the United States” and “bigamy convictions” (pp. 231–32).
This reform would help to enable the investigations that might grow
from glimmers of cognitive distrust or epistemic curiosity. Because the
reform would lower the administrative burdens to conducting such an
investigation, pursuing the inquiry wouldn’t require such sustained and
robust doubt.213 Recent work in cognitive science suggests that curiosity
is enhanced by knowledge gaps when an individual perceives they have
the “skills, expertise, and resources needed to resolve the uncertainty.”214
Whereas a knowledge gap that appears more difficult or impossible to
resolve may lead to anxiety and diminished curiosity.215 Making information more readily available may not only enable, but also enhance,
curiosity.
Moreover, if these investigations became easier, norms might shift as
to whether such inquiries are appropriate or even expected — as
opposed to their current status, among some, as unusual or even paranoid.216 With the rise of internet dating, inter alia, in other communities
investigating an intimate has already become expected or encouraged217 — and there, such a registry would facilitate access to reliable
sources of information. Knowing that sources are solid may also support
affective trust, a feeling of safety, alongside enabling curiosity.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
213 On the role of administrative burdens in discouraging or thwarting certain actions, see, for
example, PAMELA HERD & DONALD P. MOYNIHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN 15–41 (2018);
Emens, supra note 4, at 1451–54; Nir Eyal, Paul L. Romain & Christopher Robertson, Can Rationing Through Inconvenience Be Ethical?, 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.–Feb. 2018, at 10, 10.
214 Matthias J. Gruber & Charan Ranganath, How Curiosity Enhances Hippocampus-Dependent
Memory: The Prediction, Appraisal, Curiosity, and Exploration (PACE) Framework, 23 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 1014, 1018 (2019) (citations omitted).
215 Id. at 1017; see also id. at 1018. Note, however, that the latter citation may be referring more
to what’s termed “trait curiosity,” which is a persistent feature of an individual, than to “state curiosity,” which is our subject here.
216 For a few examples of the popular view that a person who investigates their partner is paranoid
or controlling, see Jenna Birch, Is It Ever OK to Read Your Partner’s Texts and Emails?, HEALTH (June
7, 2018), https://www.health.com/relationships/should-you-snoop-on-partner [https://perma.cc/UH8MH5E3] (“Snooping won’t solve your relationship problems . . . . If you cannot trust your partner, you
either need to ‘take a serious look at your own insecurities or admit to yourself that you are with someone you do not trust . . . . If you have to ask to see your partner’s texts or email, you have crossed a
line.’” (quoting clinical psychologist Mary Lamia)); Andrea Bonior, 20 Signs Your Partner Is
Controlling, PSYCH. TODAY (June 1, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/friendship20/201506/20-signs-your-partner-is-controlling [https://perma.cc/F6TD-LYLF] (“Perhaps he or she
checks your phone, logs into your email, or constantly tracks your Internet history, and then justifies
this by saying they’ve been burned before, [or] have trust issues . . . . It’s a violation of your privacy,
hand-in-hand with the unsettling message that they have no interest in trusting you and instead want
to take on a police-like presence within your relationship.”).
217 See, e.g., Alyson Krueger, The Best Ways to “Research” Someone You Meet Online, FORBES
(Apr. 30, 2014, 12:21 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alysonkrueger/2014/04/30/the-best-ways-toresearch-someone-you-meet-online [https://perma.cc/FZ8D-3SF9]; see also Study: How Single
Americans Research Each Other Before Dates, JDP (Oct. 2018), https://www.jdp.com/blog/studyonline-dating-statistics [https://perma.cc/5VFX-C8SG]. The latter study is on point, but its conclusion should be considered in light of the source: a company that specializes in screening people.
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3. A Proposal that Runs Counter to Trust. — One secondary solution
Hasday offers fails the test of trustworthiness, or threatens to do so. She
floats as “worth serious consideration” (p. 224) the idea that, in order to
claim parenthood on a birth certificate, a person should have to take a
DNA test so that they would know whether they are a genetic parent
and so adult children would later have access to this information (pp.
221–26). If implemented, she suggests, this policy would help prevent
people (typically women) from lying to other people (typically men)
about parentage (p. 221).
Hasday presents this registration idea as a kind of stopgap proposal
because deception over parentage is one area where Hasday wants to
deny remedies for intimate deceivers; she views the potential damage to
children — to have the person thought to be their parent suing for the
damage of having been so thought — to outweigh the presumedparent’s interest in the suit for deception (pp. 221–23). A DNA registry
would compensate for this exception to broader remedies for victims of
intimate deception by providing some prophylaxis. Under such a system
of DNA registration, a “man would know before embarking on the lifealtering work of parenting a child whether he was that child’s biological
father,” such that it would “protect that child from later shocks and
disruptions” (p. 222).
Hasday tries to make this DNA registry neutral between men and
women, and between same-sex and different-sex couples, in the sense
that anyone can register on the birth certificate once the testing is done
(p. 221). She proposes that, under the regime, “once a genetic parent
agreed that someone without genetic ties to the child should be named
as a legal parent on the birth certificate, genetics could not subsequently
be a reason to privilege the genetic parent over the nongenetic parent in
legal proceedings” (p. 222). But as I read Hasday, such a rule is not
neutral. Under the regime she contemplates, it sounds as though parents
must undergo genetic testing at the moment of the child’s birth, and one
(genetic) intending parent will have the legal power to decide whether
the other (nongenetic) intending parent is listed on the birth certificate.
Such a regime not only treats couples with a mix of genetic and nongenetic parents differently than couples where all parents are genetically
related to the child, but also assigns greater power to one parent in some
couples.218
Hasday also seems to put more trust in the authorities of science and
law than is currently warranted. For example, some work suggests that
DNA testing may not be as reliable a determinant of parentage (and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
218 Hasday does not directly say that a genetic parent would have the legal authority to grant or
deny parenthood to the other, but I infer some kind of authority from the phrase beginning “once a
genetic parent agreed” quoted above (p. 222).
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much else) as people tend to imagine.219 Hasday implies, however, that
“quality control” challenges could be overcome “with sufficient money,
time, and commitment” (p. 225). In addition, law and regulations cannot, at least not yet, safeguard privacy and prevent misuse and manipulation of genetic information (p. 225). Hasday suggests that protections
such as “requir[ing] testing facilities to destroy the samples after using
them” and “regulat[ing] testing facilities to safeguard against mistakes”
could assuage privacy and quality control concerns (p. 225). Unless or
until the system proves trustworthy, though, nobody should be forced to
trust it — especially not individuals in the throes of becoming parents,
one way or another, and preparing to take a child home from the hospital or other site of arrival.
The innovation Hasday contemplates would seem poised to diminish
affective trust, the feeling of safety, for some people entering this central
relationship together. Moreover, it isn’t enabling curiosity or inquiry; it
is forcing information on people who may not want it. For example,
some gay men will mix sperm so that they do not know from birth who
is genetically related to a child they parent together.220 If Hasday’s proposal requires them and the child to engage in genetic testing to establish
who has genetic links at the time of birth, someone now has (possibly
imperfect) information that those parents wanted no one to have.
Preventing deception is not worth the bold and invasive experiment
Hasday contemplates.
Ultimately, Hasday raises multiple concerns about a genetic registry,
and she does not fully endorse this proposal. As noted earlier, she merely
suggests it is “worth serious consideration” by lawmakers (p. 224). So
perhaps Hasday is also less than fully trusting of its merits.
4. Using the Framework to Refine Hasday’s Central Proposal. —
The framework of affective trust and epistemic curiosity also helps build
a firmer foundation for Hasday’s central proposal, and offers a narrower
way to expand the scope of redress for intimate deception. Hasday
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
219 See, e.g., Carl W. Gilmore, Challenging DNA in Paternity Cases: Finding Weaknesses in an
Evidentiary Goliath, 90 ILL. B.J. 472, 474–75, 492 (2002); Peter Aldhous, The Danger of Unreliable
Paternity Tests, NEW SCIENTIST (Dec. 1, 2010), https://www.newscientist.com/article/
mg20827893-200-the-danger-of-unreliable-paternity-tests [https://perma.cc/S2FH-G9DQ]. But see
Adam Rutherford, How Accurate Are Online DNA Tests?, SCI. AM. (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.
scientificamerican.com/article/how-accurate-are-online-dna-tests [https://perma.cc/Y2H4-Y2A7]
(“When it comes to ancestry, DNA is very good at determining close family relations such as siblings
or parents . . . .”). On other concerns about DNA testing relevant to this discussion, see, for example, Alondra Nelson, The Social Life of DNA: Racial Reconciliation and Institutional Morality
After the Genome, 69 BRIT. J. SOC. 522, 532–33 (2018).
220 See, e.g., Dana Berkowitz & William Marsiglio, Gay Men: Negotiating Procreative, Father,
and Family Identities, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 366, 378 (2007); Dean A. Murphy, The Desire for
Parenthood: Gay Men Choosing to Become Parents Through Surrogacy, 34 J. FAM. ISSUES 1104,
1117 (2013) (describing this practice as “intentional unknowing”).

2020]

ON TRUST, LAW, AND EXPECTING THE WORST

2005

argues that, rather than so commonly denying redress for intimate deception, courts should adopt a presumption of treating intimate deception just like any other deception.
This seems sensible enough. And yet this proposal is vulnerable to
the critique, discussed earlier,221 that it would open the courts to a flood
of cases. And more than just a numerical problem, which perhaps
should be overcome if the change were warranted on the merits, the
proposal must respond to the concern about courts trying to determine
who is at fault when a conflict between intimates concerns the stuff of
their intimacy. As the critics of fault-based divorce have argued, determining fault in an intimate relationship is exceedingly difficult.222
Moreover, the proposal leaves open the question of how courts are to
know when the presumption of equal treatment for intimate deception
is overcome, outside of cases involving subordinating norms related to
race or gender.223
The framework I present offers a way to navigate both of these dilemmas. Under the framework, cases that concern the courts should be
those in which one party has used the affective trust created or sustained
through intimacy to overcome or subdue the other party’s epistemic curiosity about a matter of life, liberty, or property. That is, when one
party’s sense of emotional safety is exploited to create a loss beyond the
relationship itself, courts should be prepared to intervene.
By way of illustration, all the cases set out at the start of this Review
would have some prospect of recovery under this framework. The
woman in Gubin v. Lodisev224 whose Soviet husband married her for
citizenship was duped into substantial labor, affecting her professional
career, to support his immigration case.225 The young woman in Hanna
v. Sheflin226 whose parents said they had invested her car accident recovery when they had actually spent it, lost the money and, perhaps, the
chance to recover the money because of the time lapse facilitated by

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
221
222
223

See supra section I.D, pp. 1973–78.
See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 49, at 1296–97.
Hasday discusses several scenarios when courts should overcome the presumption, such as
“when granting redress would inflict significant injury on a blameless third party or when telling
the truth would have placed the deceiver or a third party in imminent physical danger” (p. 227; see
also p. 207). In her earlier discussion of the historical movement away from race-based claims of
intimate deception, see supra notes 16 and 127 and accompanying text, and gender-subordinating
norms explicitly animating these cases, see supra p. 1970, Hasday has already suggested that she
would not want intimate deception cases to succeed where they rely on subordinating norms.
224 494 N.W.2d 782 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
225 Id. at 784.
226 275 S.W.3d 423 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
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their lies.227 Lastly, in Dahl v. McNutt,228 the brother who gave up his
kidney would clearly have a case that affective trust was manipulated
to stem epistemic curiosity by him or his sister or both. Whether his
sister would have a viable claim would depend on whether she had
meaningful losses beyond the disappointment of a failed relationship.
As signaled by this last example, various cases would not be heard
in court under this framework. A suit alleging a breach of promise to
marry would be dismissed, even if the promisor knew he was lying rather than merely changing his mind, in the absence of some material
consequence beyond the loss of, or damage to, the relationship itself —
as would a case of adultery.229 By contrast, bigamy would be actionable
as a civil suit for intimate deception because the duped partner would
be deprived of the legal status of spouse.230
That this framework would apply to the three cases at the start of
this Review does not mean that all these plaintiffs — or those like
them — would necessarily win. Nor does it mean the cases will be easy
to resolve. But this refinement of Hasday’s proposal offers a way to
parse which cases of intimate deception should receive a full and fair
trial, rather than being dismissed as beyond the purview of the courts:
those cases in which an intimate trades on the affective trust of the other,
to compromise the epistemic curiosity (or cognitive distrust) of the other,
resulting in losses beyond the relationship itself.231
By offering parties the possibility of compensation in such cases, under Hasday’s proposal or this variation on it, courts will better support
affective trust, allowing intimates to rest more safely in their relationships, because the material consequences of being duped are not as
great — as discussed earlier.232 And courts will also be supporting epistemic curiosity, because pursuing an inkling that an intimate has lied
may well lead to a firmer answer and material compensation in the
courts, in at least some circumstances. Curiosity may ultimately be rewarded by more than just disappointment.
***
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
227 Id. at 425. Since she waited some time before asking for the money, the additional time lapse
may not have mattered, but this would presumably be an argument she would make, which might
get some traction.
228 No. C3-97-601906, slip op. (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 1998).
229 Hasday describes cases of breach of promise to marry and adultery (pp. 101–04). Note that
Hasday does not argue for repeal of the anti–heart balm statutes, so many breach of promise to
marry cases would also be unsuccessful under her proposed regime.
230 Hasday discusses cases of bigamy (pp. 163–65).
231 And indeed, this proposal may not alter many outcomes beyond Hasday’s proposal, since hers
piggybacks on the law of non-intimate deception and so some harm beyond the relationship may
be effectively required there as well.
232 See supra section III.B.1, pp. 1999–2001.
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The framework set out here also helps to illuminate two other legal
contexts: a recent innovation in the law of evidence; and a novel approach to prenuptial agreements. The final two sections consider each
in turn.
C. Jettisoning Trust: Spousal Privilege in State v. Gutierrez
The fact that nothing you say to your spouse can be used against you
in a court of law makes me feel safe.
— Elie Mystal233
In the month after Oxford published Intimate Lies and the Law, the
New Mexico Supreme Court issued a landmark decision. With the ruling in State v. Gutierrez,234 New Mexico became the only state with no
form of spousal privilege.235 The question of whether to exclude evidence based on spousal privilege is complicated, and this short section
does not attempt a full weighing of the values and costs at stake. But
an attention to the need for both affective trust and epistemic curiosity
adds an overlooked element to the debates.
In the law of evidence, the spousal privilege comprises two quite
different privileges: testimonial and marital confidences. Under the testimonial privilege, a person may refuse to testify, or be prevented from
testifying, against a spouse.236 Under the marital confidences privilege,
a person may exclude testimony about communications made privately
between spouses during a marriage.237 A majority of states and the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
233 Elie Mystal, New Mexico Abolishes Spousal Privilege and I Have No Idea Who to Talk to
About That, ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 6, 2019, 11:46 AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/09/newmexico-abolishes-spousal-privilege [https://perma.cc/Q2UB-S5AV].
234 No. S-1-SC-36394, 2019 WL 4167270 (N.M. Aug. 30, 2019).
235 Id. at *21 (Vigil, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
236 See, e.g., RUTTER GROUP PRACTICE GUIDE, FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS & EVIDENCE
8:3740; Michael H. Graham, Husband-Wife Privilege: Testimonial, in 4 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 505:1 (8th ed.); Marital Privilege, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.
cornell.edu/wex/marital_privilege [https://perma.cc/9NJ4-MNTJ]. There are variations across the
fifty states as to whether the privilege applies to civil cases, criminal cases, or both; whether it
applies only during a marriage or also after a marriage has ended; and which spouse(s) are able to
prevent testimony. All states recognize exceptions for civil suits between spouses and cases where
one spouse commits a crime against the other. See Memorandum from Zane Muller to Elizabeth
F. Emens (Jan. 18, 2020) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) [hereinafter Muller Memorandum] (compiling current law of testimonial and marital privileges in all fifty states).
In most of the states that recognize the testimonial privilege, and in the federal courts, the
right lies with the witness spouse, who may waive the privilege over the defendant spouse’s objection. See Muller Memorandum, supra; see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980)
(setting out the testimonial privilege rule in federal courts). In some states, however, the privilege
is held by only the defendant spouse or by both spouses. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134062 (2009) (granting the privilege exclusively to the defendant spouse); KY. R. EVID. 504(a) (granting the privilege to both spouses); see also Muller Memorandum, supra.
237 As with the testimonial privilege, there is variation across jurisdictions in who holds the privilege and whether it applies in civil cases, criminal cases, or both. See Muller Memorandum, supra
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federal courts recognize the testimonial privilege, though a sizable number have affirmatively abandoned it and others have limited its scope.238
Prior to Gutierrez, all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal courts recognized the marital confidences privilege in some form.239
New Mexico eliminated the testimonial privilege nearly forty years
ago.240 With Gutierrez, New Mexico also became the first state to end
the marital confidences privilege.241 In the eponymous case, Gutierrez
had revealed a secret to both his first wife and his second wife, which
he sought to suppress at his trial.242 The secret was that he murdered
his first wife’s uncle, a few months after she told Gutierrez that the uncle
had raped her repeatedly.243 Gutierrez told her “not to worry about
anything anymore,” and later he came home agitated, showed her the
body, and involved her in looking for a bullet casing he’d left there.244
After their divorce, he ended up telling his second wife, after his parents
repeatedly stated that they would “send him away for the rest of his
life.”245 Ultimately Gutierrez and his second wife separated as well, and
Gutierrez was indicted thirteen years after the murder.246 At his murder
trial, Gutierrez sought to exclude both women’s testimony about his
confessions, and on appeal the New Mexico Supreme Court decided to
abolish the marital confidences privilege.247
Chief Justice Judith Nakamura’s majority opinion reviewed several
arguments for and against the privilege, including the position that protecting marital confidences supports privacy and autonomy, as well as
encourages communication between spouses.248 The opinion concluded,
however, that the opposing arguments won the day.249 Among other
reasons, the court was not persuaded that the privilege makes any
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
note 236. In some cases, marital confidences are not admissible regardless of the wishes of the
parties. R. Michael Cassidy, Reconsidering Spousal Privileges After Crawford, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L.
339, 366–67 (2006).
238 Cassidy, supra note 237, at 364–65 (“Thirty one states and the District of Columbia recognize
the adverse testimonial privilege [as of 2006]. Nineteen states have abandoned this privilege entirely . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also Muller Memorandum, supra note 236.
239 Cassidy, supra note 237, at 365–66 (noting that, as of 2006, “[a]ll fifty states and the District
of Columbia recognize a privilege for confidential communications between spouses” (citation omitted)); United States v. Brock, 724 F.3d 817, 820–21 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussing the federal marital
confidences privilege); see also Muller Memorandum, supra note 236.
240 Richard A. Gonzales, Evidence, 11 N.M. L. REV. 159, 175 (1980–1981).
241 State v. Gutierrez, No. S-1-SC-36394, 2019 WL 4167270, at *21 (N.M. Aug. 30, 2019) (Vigil,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at *1 (majority opinion).
242 Id. at *1 (majority opinion).
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id. at *4–8.
249 Id. at *8.
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practical difference in whether spouses communicate, because people
don’t know about the privilege250 and because they don’t go to court
very often.251 “Spouses communicate openly with one another due to
the ‘trust they place in the loyalty and discretion of each other,’ not
because the privilege shields their communications from future disclosure in court.”252
Two justices dissented from the ruling. Justice Charles Daniels
agreed with the change, but objected to the court’s decision on institutional grounds.253 Justice Barbara Vigil, by contrast, dissented on the
merits.254 Her opinion began one of its sections by quoting Obergefell255:
“Marriage ‘fulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that
express our common humanity.’”256 This sounds in our notion of affective trust, as does some of the commentary following the decision:
“[T]hat spousal privilege just seems like a thing that gets to the heart of
keeping the state out of your life. The fact that nothing you say to your
spouse can be used against you in a court of law makes me feel safe.”257
Justice Vigil’s dissent argued: “As a solemn vow of unity, marriage creates for many a sacred space to share oneself with a chosen other. That
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
250 Id. at *6 (“One of its principal weaknesses is that it rests on two untested assumptions: that
(1) married people know the privilege exists, and (2) they rely on it when deciding how much information to share.” (citing 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 86, at 523 (7th
ed. 2013))). Chief Justice Nakamura continued, noting that “[c]ritics argue ‘that there is no empirical evidence to support [these] factual assumptions.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting
25 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 25 FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE, § 5572, at 532 (1989)).
251 Id. (“Additionally, most people are unlikely to alter their behavior based on the privilege because most people seldom appear in court and do not tailor their conversations around what may
or may not be privileged.”).
252 Id. (quoting BROUN, supra note 250, § 86, at 523).
253 Id. at *21 (Daniels, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that “a change
to an evidence rule, particularly a significant change unnecessary to a dispositive outcome in litigation before us, should be handled through our established rules process, with input from the rules
committee, with input from the larger legal community, and with input from the state we serve”).
Since our subject is intimacy, it is perhaps worth noting that Justice Daniels apparently died two
days after writing this opinion, and some of his language suggests a fond farewell to his colleagues.
Eugene Volokh, N.M. Abolishes Marital Communication Privilege, Based in Large Part on Feminist Arguments, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 14, 2019, 5:10 PM), https://reason.com/2019/09/14/nm-abolishes-marital-communication-privilege-based-largely-on-feminist-arguments
[https://perma.cc/7AYT-ZXWW].
254 Gutierrez, 2019 WL 4167270, at *16 (Vigil, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
255 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
256 Gutierrez, 2019 WL 4167270, at *17 (Vigil, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599).
257 Mystal, supra note 233 (emphasis added). The argument continues, “I’d argue that the confines of one’s relationship is where the expectation of privacy is the strongest. I don’t have to know
how it works to know, and justifiably rely upon the fact, that when I fantasize with my spouse the
six people I’d like to see die in a structure fire, that’s not going to come back on me if one of those
people ends up falling down an elevator shaft in our building.” Id.
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space should remain free from state intrusion and compulsion that
would demand one spouse to reveal the intimate secrets of the other.”258
The gender dimensions of this case are interesting, and they feature
explicitly in the majority opinion. Chief Justice Nakamura mentioned,
among other arguments, that the privilege has been used to shield domestic abusers.259 As the dissent from Justice Vigil pointed out, however, New Mexico’s spousal privilege already had an exception for
domestic violence.260 Chief Justice Nakamura also observed that most
defendants who invoke the privilege, even today, are men, using it to
prevent women from betraying their confidences.261
Her concern with men preventing women from revealing their secrets is typical in its focus on the ex post scenario, where secrets have
already been revealed, and the question is how to handle them. What
is overlooked are the gender implications of whether the secrets are
shared in the first place.
Courts commonly assume that men tell their wives their misdeeds.262
He must have told her — is an implicit if not explicit refrain. Reading
Intimate Lies and the Law casts a spotlight on how often he doesn’t tell
her. Moreover, it’s not so surprising that courts aren’t as inclined to say,
She must have asked him if he did it. We do not assume that women
ask their mates the hard questions. We do not encourage them to do so.
“Trust . . . then jump!” is our romantic myth instead.
Gutierrez did reveal the secret of his crime to both his first wife and
his second wife.263 The first time was to seek wife #1’s help with the
cover-up.264 The second was also not whispers across a pillow. Instead,
overhearing an argument between Gutierrez and his parents led wife #2
to ask.265 Nonetheless, she did ask, and he did tell.266
Evincing curiosity about this kind of bad news is no easy feat. The
growing literature on information avoidance is spotlighting just how
much people feel they do not want to know bad news.267 Such inklings
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
258
259
260

Gutierrez, 2019 WL 4167270, at *17 (Vigil, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at *8 (majority opinion).
Id. at *17 (Vigil, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Majority’s argument that
the spousal communications privilege cannot be justified on privacy grounds without ignoring the
private pain of domestic violence victims itself ignores that New Mexico has abrogated the spousal
communications privilege in cases where one spouse is accused of inflicting harm on the other.”
(citations omitted)).
261 Id. at *7–8 (majority opinion).
262 See, e.g., United States v. Corchado-Peralta, 318 F.3d 255, 258 (1st Cir. 2003). I thank Daniel
Richman for this point.
263 Gutierrez, 2019 WL 4167270, at *1.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer & Rocio Garcia-Retamero, Cassandra’s Regret: The Psychology of
Not Wanting to Know, 124 PSYCHOL. REV. 179, 193 (2017); Russell Golman, David Hagmann &
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of curiosity may need whatever encouragement they can get. And, as
discussed earlier, recent empirical work suggests that people’s curiosity
is increased by the prospect of actually getting an answer to a query.268
In addition, knowing that your spouse could tell you their secrets, and
feel those secrets are as safe with you as with their lawyer, could help
support affective trust, a feeling of safety.269
Taken together, these points present one more argument on the side
of preserving the marital confidences privilege. Though deciding
whether the privilege is justified goes beyond the scope of this Review,
the need to build affective trust and epistemic curiosity supplies one
more reason to wish the justices had paused to read Hasday’s latest
book, released one month earlier, before making New Mexico the first
state to abolish the marital confidences privilege.
D. Trust . . . and Ask: Prenup Wrappers
Why do so many couples opt for the same vows?
— Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers270
Whatever else it might do, a marital confidences evidentiary privilege will do nothing for partners who are not, or not yet, married —
many of whom populate the pages of Intimate Lies and the Law. This
section considers an innovation to support affective trust and epistemic
curiosity among the not-yet-married.
Most marrying couples don’t appear to sign prenuptial agreements,
as noted earlier.271 The mythology of “trust . . . then jump” seems incompatible with the standard agenda of the prenup: to plot a pathway
through divorce. Suggesting a prenup therefore makes a person sound
less serious about marriage or commitment.
Professor Gary Becker once proposed a solution to this dilemma:
mandatory prenups.272 If everyone has to sign a prenup, then the fact
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
George Loewenstein, Information Avoidance, 55 J. ECON. LIT. 96, 96–97 (2017); Cass R. Sunstein,
Ruining Popcorn?: The Welfare Effects of Information, 58 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121, 125–27
(2019); see also Caroline J. Charpentier, Ethan S. Bromberg-Martin & Tali Sharot, Valuation of
Knowledge and Ignorance in Mesolimbic Reward Circuitry, 115 PNAS, at E7255 (2018) (finding,
inter alia, that reward systems in the brain lead humans to choose ignorance about unfavorable
future outcomes).
268 See supra p. 2002.
269 Cf. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L. REV.
2045, 2115 (1995) (making a related point about the testimonial privilege).
270 Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Couples Should Negotiate Their Marriage Vows, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2012, 12:32 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/01/20/thegingrich-question-cheating-vs-open-marriage/couples-should-negotiate-their-marriage-vows
[https://perma.cc/4KVD-2QSF].
271 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
272 Gary S. Becker, Why Every Couple Should Sign a Contract, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 29, 1997,
12:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1997-12-28/why-every-married-coupleshould-sign-a-contract [https://perma.cc/T8Y6-UJ38].
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of doing so would convey nothing about a person’s intentions — beyond
what is said in the prenup itself.273 And of course a prenup could clarify,
in a separate property state, that all property is shared and that partners
plan to take care of each other, should divorce occur, contrary to the
usual self-protective, individualistic vision of prenups.274 Prenups can
also be limited by so-called sunset clauses, shifting partners into the state
defaults after a period of years once they know each other better.275 For
better or worse, though, the resistance to mandatory anything in this
country makes Becker’s proposal unlikely to take hold.
This leads to the question whether, instead of becoming mandatory,
prenups could become more appealing. Writing prenups could be part
of designing a life together, of making affirmative and positive commitments. Prenups could be more like marriage vows — and thus writing
them might be more like a wedding than a divorce.
We might call these aspirational documents “prenup wrappers.”276 The
name comes from the tool of “exam wrappers,” informal self-assessment
forms completed by students after taking an exam or upon receiving it
back.277 An exam wrapper encourages a student to be curious about their
practices and performance to date and intentions for the future; in a sense,
then, exam wrappers aim to encourage a student’s curiosity about substance and process, alongside the formal evaluation of an exam grade.278
A prenup wrapper would, similarly, couple informal inquiry with the
formal legal apparatus of an enforceable prenup. It might cover, for
instance, any of the following: general aspirations (such as the kinds of
things typically found in wedding vows); daily intentions (such as how
partners aim to treat each other or appreciate each other in a routine
way279); roles and responsibilities (such as how partners intend to divvy
up household labor, which could be “customized” and more or less detailed, or which could use an off-the-rack model like “gender equity” or
“relational” roles280); shared values (such as agreements about
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
273
274

See id.
See, e.g., LAURIE ISRAEL, THE GENEROUS PRENUP 12–15, 41–54 (2018); Laurie Israel,
How to Mediate a Prenuptial Agreement, IVKDLAW (2017), http://ivkdlaw.com/how-to-mediate-aprenuptial-agreement [https://perma.cc/9W28-62TB].
275 A Sunset Clause Can Test a Marriage, WEINMAN & ASSOCIATES (May 20, 2016),
https://www.weinmanfamilylaw.com/blog/2016/05/a-sunset-clause-can-test-a-marriage.shtml
[https://perma.cc/LW2B-7BEH].
276 I thank Ian Harris for the thoughtful question that sparked this idea of prenup wrappers.
277 E.g., Sarah J. Schendel, What You Don’t Know (Can Hurt You): Using Exam Wrappers to
Foster Self-Assessment Skills in Law Students, 40 PACE L. REV. 154, 161–62 (2020).
278 Id.
279 Cf. STAN TATKIN, WIRED FOR LOVE 98–101 (2012).
280 These terms come from Professor Barbara Stark’s proposal for “marriage proposals” in which
partners claim their model going in to the marriage, with legal consequences. Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1479,
1528–29 (2001).
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monogamy281 or parenting); hard times (such as plans for challenging
events that might arise, like job loss); questions for inquiry (such as a
record of questions asked of themselves and each other pre-marriage,
from the existential to the mundane to the probing282); or process intentions (such as an agreement on process if they disagree or one or both
are contemplating separation). Wholesale versions would be available,
but of course partners could choose to customize and do more, less, or
something other than this list of possible elements.
The prenup wrapper would be conceived with the understanding
that change would occur, which is one reason not to attempt to make
the wrapper legally enforceable. “Lifestyle clauses” in prenups — which
integrate some of the items proposed here within the four corners of a
prenup — are often unenforceable, and even in states that enforce them,
their enforcement is unpredictable.283 Another reason, then, not to include them in the prenup itself is so partners avoid the cost of paying a
lawyer to review these items.284 Moreover, these lifestyle clauses tend
to be framed more in terms of prohibitions and consequences — for
instance, limits on how much weight a spouse can gain285 — rather than
in any more affirmative vision of shared values or intentions.
The prenup wrapper is similar in some ways to, for instance, a “letter
of intent” to designated guardian(s) that a parent writing a will might
complete.286 Such a letter is unenforceable, but a trusts and estates lawyer might recommend it as a vehicle for communicating the child’s needs
and the parents’ aspirations for the child’s care. A lawyer might therefore provide a version with blanks to help the client complete the process. The prenup wrapper is different, however, in the present purposes
it may serve for those who create it.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
281 See, e.g., Lifestyle Clauses and Marital Agreements, FROST & BECK PC (Mar. 19, 2014)
https://www.frostbecklaw.com/blog/2014/03/lifestyle-clauses-and-marital-agreements.shtml
[https://perma.cc/J8WU-VW9U].
282 For ideas for these kinds of questions, see generally, for example, SUSAN PIVER, THE HARD
QUESTIONS (2000), or, more playfully, GREGORY STOCK, THE BOOK OF QUESTIONS (2013).
283 See, e.g., Lifestyle Clauses and Marital Agreements, supra note 281; see also Debra Cassens Weiss,
No Cheating! Lifestyle Clauses Gain Popularity in Prenups, ABA J. (June 5, 2013, 12:00 PM),
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[https://perma.cc/ZD3E-QR6A]; What’s a Prenuptial “Lifestyle” Clause?, MARVEL & WONG, PLLC
(Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.mwfamilylaw.com/blog/2018/02/whats-a-prenuptial-lifestyle-clause.shtml
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284 Of course this is not necessarily a plus for the lawyers.
285 See, e.g., Monica Mizzi, Should You Add a “Lifestyle Clause” to Your Prenup? (Or Are They
Just for Celebrities?), HUFFPOST (July 22, 2016, 12:18 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/should-you-add-a-lifestyle-clause-to-your-prenup_b_57908891e4b0a9208b5f1876
[https://perma.cc/ZW8H-3LV6].
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Various authorities, from lawmakers and legal scholars to mental
health professionals and religious advisors, have encouraged partners
contemplating marriage to engage in big conversations or premarital
counseling.287 What distinguishes prenup wrappers is that the extralegal conversation is wrapped around — “braided” with288 — the legal
inquiry, rather than constituting a separate event, on the one hand, or
an actual component of the formal legal prenup, on the other.289 The
aim would be to support both epistemic curiosity and affective trust.
The formal legal prenup is commonly seen as an emblem of distrust — not even of curiosity, however defined. As one commentator
put it, “If you want a prenup, you don’t want marriage.”290 To combine
its creation with a process of setting out affirmative aspirations may
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
287 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 741.0305 (2014) (reducing the marriage license fee by $32.50 if couples
engage in premarital counseling with a qualified psychologist, social worker, therapist, or religious
institution representative); Matthew J. Astle, An Ounce of Prevention: Marital Counseling Laws as
an Anti-divorce Measure, 38 FAM. L.Q. 733, 741–743 (2004) (discussing the history of premarital
counseling legislation and arguing that more states should follow Florida’s approach of incentivizing premarital counseling as a means to lower divorce rates); Nicole Licata, Note, Should Premarital Counseling Be Mandatory as a Requisite to Obtaining a Marriage License?, 40 FAM. CT. REV.
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(“The contract combines formal and informal methods of enforcement through a process we term
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289 This braiding feature also distinguishes prenup wrappers from the “marriage contracts” that
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Before, Within, and in Lieu of Legal Marriage, 1 ALTERNATIVE LIFESTYLES 303, 311–13 (1978)
(describing intimate contracts).
290 W. Bradford Wilcox, If You Want a Prenup, You Don’t Want Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5,
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make the prenup more palatable — thus supporting epistemic curiosity
in the form of an active stance toward the problem of what-if-the-worsthappens.291 More substantively, the prenup wrapper encourages interpersonal curiosity292 at a moment when its opposite — “trust . . . then
jump” — is celebrated and mythologized. This may help prepare for
challenging times ahead by confronting some of those challenges with
eyes wide open now.293
Moreover, the process of learning about each other and communicating about past, present, and future may help to build connection and
deepen the relationship in the present moment.294 The openness associated with interest curiosity, that subspecies of epistemic curiosity, may
be cultivated by such dialogue.295 A prenup wrapper might even contain questions the parties intend to ask at particular intervals, or some
other process for cultivating genuine curiosity about one another.296 Relationships vary, and only some marrying couples would opt for this
approach. But for those who do, the prenup wrapper could support
affective trust as well as truthful exchange.297 Trust . . . and ask.298
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291 Cf., e.g., Becker, supra note 272; Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 270 (making the case for
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***
Happy prenup wrappers and spousal testimonial privileges illustrate
the uses of considering affective trust alongside epistemic curiosity, but
they help only those who marry or contemplate marriage. Hasday’s central proposal, however, reaches more broadly. If courts begin presuming
that intimate lies be treated the same as other lies, trusting gets safer
across relationship types — as safe as trusting can be, that is. And these
cases can be usefully cabined by limiting successful claims of intimate deception to those cases in which one partner parlays affective trust to overcome epistemic curiosity and engage in self-dealing. Such a legal regime
should support affective trust and epistemic curiosity in intimate relationships without flooding the courts with disappointed lovers.
CONCLUSION
[N]orms promoting trust within intimacy can help foster individual
fulfillment, productive cooperation, committed caregiving, and satisfying
community life . . . .
— Jill Elaine Hasday (p. 51)
Hasday has supplied a rigorous, engaging treatment of intimate lies
and the law. She has shed light on the gender dimensions of our practices
of lying and truth telling, and the system that supports those practices.
And this important book has also offered provocative questions and
promising proposals to support a combination of trust and distrust.
I have presented a framework combining affective trust and epistemic curiosity to evaluate Hasday’s proposals and recent legal developments as well as to spur innovations. Ultimately, if cognitive distrust
takes the form of curiosity, not insatiable but willing to be satisfied eventually, then that curiosity may well support a deeper form of affective
trust. Asking the questions in the back of their minds may better enable
partners to inhabit the trust that comes after the answers.
Intimate Lies and the Law has illuminated this overlooked area of
law and offered some promising ideas for legal reform. Perhaps this
compelling book will also make it easier for individuals to ask hard
questions, to find out the answers, and to settle in to a feeling of security
in their intimate relationships, comforted by the legal and social safety
net that can catch them when they fall.
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